Strategic Forecasting Report on Pakistani Jihadis

[Blog Managers disclaimer: Linda and Ray do not endorse the conclusions in this report. We are reposting the article because we belive it contains useful information about the power structures in the Pakistan military and the political relations between Jihadists and military.]

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The Jihadist Insurgency in Pakistan
February 6, 2008 | 1616 GMT
Graphic for Terrorism Intelligence Report

By Kamran Bokhari

The increasing crisis of governance in Pakistan over the past several
months has triggered many queries from Stratfor readers, most wanting to
know how events will ultimately play out. Would a collapse of the
Musharraf regime lead to a jihadist takeover? How safe are the country’s
nuclear weapons? What are the security implications for Afghanistan?
Topmost among the questions is whether Pakistan will remain a viable state.

Globally, there are fears that the collapse of the current regime could
lead to an implosion of the state itself, with grave repercussions on
regional and international security. Pakistanis themselves are very much
concerned about a disaster of national proportions, particularly if the
Feb. 18 elections go awry.

Although there are conflicting theories on what will happen in and to
Pakistan, most have one thing in common. They focus on the end result,
seeing the unfolding events as moving in a straight line from Point A to
Point B. They deem Point B — the collapse of Pakistan — to be an
unavoidable outcome of the prevailing conditions in the country. Such
predictions, however, do not account for the many arrestors and other
variables that will influence the chain of events.

Though there are many, many reasons for concern in Pakistan, state
breakdown is not one of them. Such an extreme outcome would require the
fracturing of the military and/or the army’s loss of control over the
core of the country — neither of which is about to happen. That said,
the periphery of the country, especially the northwestern border
regions, could become an increasing challenge to the writ of the state.

We have said on many occasions that Islamabad is unlikely to restore
stability and security any time soon, largely because of structural
issues. In other words, the existing situation is likely to persist for
some time — and could even deteriorate further. This raises the
question: How bad can things get?

The answer lies in the institutional cohesiveness of Pakistan’s military
establishment and the geographical structure of the country.
The Army

Stratfor recently pointed out that the army — rather than any particular
military general — is the force that holds the state together.
Therefore, the collapse of the state would come about only if the
military establishment were to fracture. For several reasons, this is
extremely unlikely.

Pakistan’s army is a highly disciplined organization made up of roughly
half a million personnel. This force usually is led by at least two
four-star generals — the chief of the army staff and chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The leadership also consists of nine
corps commanders and several other principal staff officers — all
three-star generals. Beneath these approximately 30 lieutenant generals
are about 150 two-star generals and some 450 one-star generals.

Moreover, and unlike in the Arab world, the Pakistani army has largely
remained free of coups from within. The generals know their personal
well-being is only as good as their collective ability to function as a
unified and disciplined force — one that can guarantee the security of
the state. The generals, particularly the top commanders, form a very
cohesive body bound together by individual, corporate and national
interests.

It is extremely rare for an ideologue, especially one with Islamist
leanings, to make it into the senior ranks. In contrast with its Turkish
counterpart, the Pakistani military sees itself as the protector of the
state’s Islamic identity, which leaves very little room for the officer
corps to be attracted to radical Islamist prescriptions. Thus, it is
extremely unlikely that jihadism — despite the presence of jihadist
sympathizers within the junior and mid-level ranks — will cause fissures
within the army.

In the absence of strong civilian institutions, the army also sees
itself as the guardian of the republic. Because of the imbalance in
civil-military relations — there is virtually no civilian oversight over
the military — the army exercises nearly complete control over the
nation’s treasury. Having directly ruled Pakistan for some 33 years of
the country’s 60-year existence, the army has become a huge corporation
with massive financial holdings.

While these interests are a reason for the army’s historical opposition
to democratic forces, they also play a major role in ensuring the
cohesiveness of the institution. Consequently, there is no danger of the
state collapsing. By extension, it is highly unlikely that the country’s
nuclear assets (which are under the control of the military through an
elaborate multilayered institutional mechanism) would fall into the
wrong hands.

Although a collapse of the state is unlikely, the military is having a
hard time running the country. This is not simply because of political
instability, which is hardwired into Pakistan’s hybrid political system,
but rather because of the unprecedented jihadist insurgency.

While civilian forces (political parties, civil society groups, the
media and the legal community) are pushing for democratic rule,
jihadists are staging guerrilla-style attacks in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the rural Pashtun districts of the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Moreover, they are mounting a
campaign of suicide bombings in major urban centers. The military does
not have the bandwidth to deal with political unrest and militancy
simultaneously — a situation that is being fully exploited by the
jihadists. The likely outcome of this trend is the state’s relative loss
of control over the areas in the northwestern periphery.
Geography and Demography

From a strictly geopolitical point of view, Pakistan’s core is the area
around the Indus River, which runs from the Karakoram/Western
Himalayan/Pamir/ Hindu Kush mountain ranges in the North to the Arabian
Sea in the South. Most areas of the provinces of Punjab and Sindh lie
east of the Indus. The bulk of the population is in this area, as is the
country’s agricultural and industrial base — not to mention most of the
transportation infrastructure. The fact that seven of the army’s nine
corps are stationed in the region (six of them in Punjab) speaks volumes
about its status as the core of the country.

In contrast, the vast majority of the areas in the NWFP, FATA,
Balochistan province, the Federally Administered Northern Areas and
Pakistani-administe red Kashmir are sparsely populated mountainous
regions — and clearly the country’s periphery. Moreover, their rough
terrain has rendered them natural buffers, shielding the core of the
country.

In our 2008 Annual Forecast for South Asia, we said the country’s
Pashtun areas could become ungovernable this year, and there already are
signs that the process is under way. Pakistani Taliban supported by al
Qaeda have seized control of many parts of the FATA and are asserting
themselves in the districts of NWFP adjacent to the tribal areas.

While Islamism and jihadism can be found across the country, the bulk of
this phenomenon is limited to the Pashtun areas — the tribal areas, the
eastern districts of NWFP and the northwestern corridor of Balochistan
province. Unlike the vast majority of Pakistanis, the Pashtuns are
disproportionately an ultra-conservative lot (both religiously and
culturally), and hence are disproportionately more susceptible to
radical Islamist and jihadist impulses. It is quite telling that in the
last elections, in 2002, this is roughly the same area in which the
Islamist alliance, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), won the bulk of
its seats in the national legislature. In addition to maintaining a
large parliamentary bloc, the MMA ran the provincial government in NWFP
and was the main partner with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League
in the coalition government in Balochistan.

Social structures and local culture, therefore, allow these areas to
become the natural habitat of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Because of the
local support base, the jihadists have been able not only to operate in
these parts, but to take them over — and even to project themselves into
the more settled areas of the NWFP. In addition to this advantage by
default, security operations, which are viewed by many within the
country as being done at the behest of the United States, have
increasingly alienated the local population.

Given the local culture of retribution, the Pashtun militants have
responded to civilian deaths during counterinsurgency operations by
increasingly adopting suicide bombings as a means of fighting back. (It
was not too long ago that the phenomenon of suicide bombings was alien
to the local culture). The war in Afghanistan and its spillover effect
on the border regions of Pakistan have created conditions in the area
that have given al Qaeda and the Taliban a new lease on life.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Resentment first toward Islamabad’s pro-U.S. policies and then the
security crackdown that began in early 2004 to root out foreign fighters
has developed into a general uprising of sorts. A younger, far more
militant generation of Pashtuns enamored of al Qaeda and the Taliban has
usurped power from the old tribal maliks. Not only has the government
failed to achieve its objective of driving a wedge between foreign
fighters and their local hosts, it has strengthened the militants’ hand.

One of the problems is the government’s haphazard approach of
alternating military operations with peace deals. Moreover, when the
government has conducted security operations, it not only has failed to
weaken the militancy, it has caused civilian casualties and/or forced
local people to flee their homes, leading to a disruption of life. When
peace agreements are made, they have not secured local cooperation
against Taliban and al Qaeda elements. The lack of a coherent policy on
how to deal with the jihadists has caused the ground situation to go
from bad to worse. At the same time, on the external front, Islamabad
has come under even more U.S. pressure to act against the militants, the
effects of which further complicate matters on the ground.

On a tactical level, while the Pakistani army has a history of
supporting insurgencies, it is ill-equipped to fight them. Even worse,
despite the deployment of some 100,000 soldiers in the region, the bulk
of security operations have involved paramilitary forces such as the
Frontier Corps, which is mostly made up of locals who have little
incentive to fight their brethren. Furthermore, Pakistan’s intelligence
capabilities already are compromised because of militant penetration of
the agencies.

In addition to these structural problems, the Musharraf government’s
battle for political survival over the past year has further prevented
the government from focusing on the jihadist problem. The only time it
acted with any semblance of resolve is when it sent the army to regain
control of the Red Mosque in the summer of 2007. However, that action
was tantamount to pouring more fuel on the militant fire.

President Pervez Musharraf, by stepping down as army chief and becoming
a civilian president, did not resolve his survival issues. In fact, it
has led to a bifurcation of power, with Musharraf sharing authority with
his successor in the militaryGen. Ashfaq Kayani. While Musharraf remains
preoccupied with making it through the coming election, Kayani is
increasingly taking charge of the fight against jihadism. The
assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto further complicated
the regime’s struggle to remain in power, leaving very little bandwidth
for dealing with the jihadists.
What Lies Ahead

With the army’s successful retaking of the district of Swat from
militants loyal to Mullah Fazlullah, Kayani has demonstrated his
abilities as a military leader. Despite this tactical victory, however,
the situation is far from stable. From a strategic point of view,
Kayani’s plans to deal with the insurgency depend heavily on the outcome
of the Feb. 18 elections (if indeed they are held). The hope is that the
political turmoil can be brought back within acceptable parameters so
the army can focus on fighting jihadists.

That would be an ideal situation for the army, because the prevailing
view is that the military needs public support in order to be successful
in combating religious extremism and terrorism. Such public support can
only be secured when an elected government comprising the various
political stakeholders is in charge. The assumption is that the policies
of such a government would be easier to implement and that if the army
has to use a combination of force and negotiations with the militants,
it will have the public’s backing instead of criticism.

But the problem is that there is an utter lack of national consensus on
what needs to be done to defeat the forces of jihadism, beyond the
simplistic view that the emphasis should be on dialogue and force should
be used sparingly. Most people believe the situation has deteriorated
because the Musharraf regime was more concerned with meeting U.S.
demands than with finding solutions that took into consideration the
realities on the ground. Islamabad knows it cannot avoid the use of
force in dealing with the militants, but because of public opposition to
such action, it fears that doing so could make the situation even worse.

Moreover, regardless of the election outcome (assuming the process is
not derailed over cries of foul play), the prospects for a national
policy on dealing with the Islamist militancy are slim. Circumstances
will require that the new government be a coalition — thus it will be
inherently weak. This, along with the deteriorating ground reality, will
leave the army with no choice but to adopt a tough approach — one it has
been avoiding for the most part.

Having led the country’s premier intelligence directorate,
Inter-Services Intelligence, Kayani is all too aware of the need to
overhaul the country’s intelligence system and root out militant
sympathizers. This is the principal way to reduce the jihadists’ ability
to stage attacks in the core areas of the country, where they have
limited support structure. While this lengthy process continues, the
army will try to contain the jihadist phenomenon on the western
periphery along the border with Afghanistan.

The Pakistani government also needs to address the problems it has
created for itself by distinguishing between “acceptable” and
“unacceptable” Taliban. Islamabad continues to support the Taliban in
Afghanistan while it is at war with the Pakistani Taliban. Given the
strong ties between the two militant groups, Islamabad cannot hope to
work with those on the other side of the border while it confronts those
in its own territory.

Further complicating matters for Islamabad is the U.S. move to engage in
overt military action on Pakistani soil in an effort to root out
transnational jihadist elements. The Pakistanis need U.S. assistance in
fighting the jihadist menace, but such assistance comes at a high
political cost on the domestic front. The ambiguity in the Pakistani
position could allow the Taliban and al Qaeda to thrive.

What this ultimately means is that the Pashtun areas could experience a
long-term insurgency, resulting in some of these areas being placed
under direct military rule. With the militants already trying to create
their own “Islamic” emirate in the tribal areas, the insurgency has the
potential to transform into a separatist struggle. Historically, the
Pakistani army tried to defeat Pashtun ethnic nationalism by promoting
Islamism — a policy that obviously has backfired miserably.
The Bottom Line

The good news for the Pakistanis — and others interested in maintaining
the status quo — is that the ongoing jihadist insurgency and the
political turmoil are unlikely to lead to the collapse of the state. The
structure of the state and the nature of Pakistani society is such that
radical Islamists, though a significant force, are unlikely to take over
the country.

On the other hand, until the army successfully cleans up its
intelligence system, suicide bombings are likely to continue across the
country. Much more significant, the Pashtun areas along the Afghan
border will be ungovernable. Pashtun jihadists and their transnational
allies on both sides of the Durand Line will continue to provide mutual
benefit until Pakistan and NATO can meaningfully coordinate their efforts.

Imposing a military solution is not an option for the Pakistanis or for
the West. Negotiations with the Taliban in the short term are not a
viable alternative either. Therefore, a long-term insurgency, which is
confined to the Pashtun areas on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani
border, is perhaps the best outcome that can be expected at this time.

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