A Dictator Defeated

A dictator defeated

Farooq Sulehria

[The author is a prominent radical journalist and leading member of Labour Party Pakistan]


Liaqat Bagh: the lush green garden in Pakistan's northern town of Rawalpindi was witnessing a very different scene on February 18 as the night set in. Unlike the bloody Benazir tragedy staged on its gates on December 27, it was a thousands-strong crowd, cheering and chanting. Waving Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) flags, chanting Jeay Bhutto (long live Bhutto) youth would embrace and congratulate even those carrying PML (N) flags. For years, led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, PML (N) was Benazir's PPP main rival. The PPP and PML (N) went to polls even on February 18, as Pakistani electorate used its right to vote for 9th time since 1970, as rivals. They all were happy as pro-Musharraf candidate, Shaikh Rashid, had been defeated in this constituency. This very constituency, NA 55, had become focus of media attention across Pakistan since it was here Benazir was murdered. Also because it was here Musharraf regime's spokesperson Shaikh Rashid, former Information Minister, was contesting elections. He had been winning, five times in total, from this constituency since 1988. He used to be a leader of PML (N) but he changed sides in 2002 and joined pro-Musharraf PML (Q), commonly mocked as Musharraf League. Being Information Minister, Rashid used to defend regime's unpopular actions thus becoming most hated face on TV screens after Musharraf's own (now-a-days- fast-wrinkling) face.

Fearing his defeat in NA 55, Rashid was also contesting from NA 56, another constituency in Rawalpindi. I happened to meet Rashid three days before elections. Defeat was written on his face.

For the fear of bomb blasts, I travel by taxi instead of public buss. Though taxi is no guarantee yet it helps get a sense of security even if it is false. Every time I would take a taxi before elections, I would question the driver: 'who gonna win Rawalpindi'. Every time, literally every time, the answer was same: 'whoever but no chance for this b@*!@^d Rashid'.

Long before TV channels had announced, Rawalpindi residents on the evening of February 18, had found out that Rashid had lost in both constituencies. In first-past-the- post system, like Britain, Rashid was not even runners up. It was PML (N) candidates, winning both constituencies while PPP-men were runners up.

Rashid was not the only victim of voters' wrath. Another 22 ministers, including president of pro-Musharraf PML (Q), Shujaat Hussein had lost. Like Rashid, Shujaat also lost from two constituencies. By next morning, it was clear that PML (Q) had lost.

An accompanying pleasant surprise was the crushing defeat of fundamentalists. In 2002elections, fundamentalists had emerged as third largest force bagging 66 National Assembly seats while forming their government in Frontier province (NWFP). They had clean swept NWFP in 2002. This time they were swept aside themselves. Only three seats in National Assembly.

In NWFP, it was secular nationalist Peoples National Party (ANP) that had emerged as largest party while Bhutto's PPP as second largest. The ANP claims the legacy of Ghaffar Khan, known as Frontier Gandhi. Traditionally, NWFP has been a stronghold of ANP that used to be proud of anti-imperialism, secularism and Pashtun-nationalism . Until 1980s, pro-Moscow Communist Party of Pakistan (legally banned in Pakistan since 1951) used to work inside ANP's predecessor (NAP or National Peoples Party). The ANP in 1990s, joined hands with right-wing PML (N) to build a coalition government. The ANP ministers proved no different when it came to corruption and financial scandals. By now, it had also given up any pretext of anti imperialism and had reconciled itself with End-of-History mantra. In the wake of S11, ANP instead of opposing US invasion of Afghanistan, lent it full support. The fundamentalists vehemently opposed it. The NWFP, country's third largest province, is inhabited by Pashtun (largest ethnic group in Afghanistan) . Hence, tribal population in NWFP saw it as an attack on Pashtuns. Fundamentalists cashed on both religious and nationalist sentiments. They portrayed it as a battle between Islam and 'Christian West'. The ANP, already discredited owing to the corruption of its ministers, by now had also build itself an image of the US pawn. Hence, it was decimated in 2002 elections. It did not win even as a single mandate for National assembly. This time, it has ten mandates in National Assembly, emerging as fifth largest party in National Assembly.

The largest in National Assembly, bagging 87 seats out of 272, is Bhutto's PPP that emerged strongest in Sindh, Bhuttos' home province. However, it was the only party that showed strong presence in all four provinces.

Not so distant runners up was PML (N), bagging 67 National Assembly seats but emerging as largest party in Punjab, country's biggest province. In Balochistan, PML (Q) got maximum seats but failed to muster simple majority. Most likely, PPP will be able to build a coalition government here.

The left in Pakistan, never a strong force in electoral politics, was further marginalized. Last time, member of a Trotskyist group, entrist in PPP, had a member elected to National Assembly as PPP candidate. He badly lost this time. The constituents of AJT, an alliance of all major left formations including Trotskyist Labour Party, had joined APDM. The APDM, an alliance of 25 parties including extreme right to extreme left, had announced a boycott of elections on the plea that elections would help Musharraf regime survive. Prior to the murder of Benazir, their campaign was picking up but the situation, it seems, radically changed after the tragic assassination. It generated a sympathy wave for PPP that also translated into high turn out despite threats of suicide bombings.

At the time of filing this report, negotiations are going between movers and shakers. The US, also shocked at election results, is pushing PPP to build a coalition government with pro-Musharraf forces while helping Musharraf stay in power. The PPP, has not taken a clear stand on impeaching Musharraf while Nawaz Sharif and media are demanding his resignation. Given the mood in Pakistan, any party going with Musharraf will be finding it hard to find a place in future political scenario here in Pakistan. Meantime, rumours are making headlines that Musharraf is resigning.

PPP backs Islamist rule in Sindh

Are we going back to the Pavilion?
Rasul Bux Palijo

Whatever the relief felt by the democratic forces of the country at the
virtual demolition of the Pro-Musharaf parties ( except of course the
super-privileged MQM ) in the 18th February elections, the basic structural
situation of the Pakistani state and society remains grim.

Pakistan continues to suffer and groan as a poverty-stricken, benighted,
backward, right-less and law-less neo-colony of the western powers headed by
the U.S. It is ruled by a hired mercenary military and civil establishment
tied to the war-chariot of western imperialism which is on a rampage of
re-conquest of the third world under the fig-leaf of a holy crusade against
the so-called Islamic terrorists. In fact they are none other than the very
same former freedom fighters declared to be of the same caliber and status
as the renowned founding fathers of U.S.A. and so-sanctified, enlisted
trained, armed and unleashed in Afghanistan against the God-less Russian and
Afghan communists by the great commander of the faithful and the freedom
fighters, the revered President Reagan himself. Retired general Musharaf who
had declared before the election that he would quit if the people turned
against him, has refused to do so now even after the virtual elimination in
recent elections of the parties supporting him. He remains dangerously armed
with his self proclaimed so-called "Constitutional powers" to dismiss the
just elected parliament, the ensuing government, the brand-new superior
judiciary created by him after dismissing the previous superior judiciary
headed by the original Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Iftikhar Mohd
Chaudhry, the power to impose an state of emergency, the power to keep
changing the Superior Judiciary through the mechanism of PCO Judges and
amending the Constitution virtually out of existence due to the lack of any
restrictions in Pakistan to the extent to which the Constitution may be
amended once a usurper general gets himself declared by the existing
Superior Judiciary to be competent to amend the Constitution of Pakistan.

As usual since two decades, MQM is once again being foisted by
the imperialist masters whose tried and tested tool of terrorism against
peaceful democratic people it has proved to be, as the ruler of Sindh in
spite of the decades-long havoc played by it over the people of Sindh
including thousands of target killings, mutilations, horrible tortures,
massive and routine loot and plunder of private and public properties and
resources and extortions.

It was allowed to continue its reign of terror and target
killings in Sindh specially in its provincial capital Karachi up to the very
last moment of the elections and even thereafter. After thousands of target
and mass killings not a single case has been allowed by the establishment
and its local stooges to be tried and concluded in any Court of law. All
cases are invariably withdrawn as a matter of course under some secret un
written law.

Now the PPP leadership has come out with a bland announcement
that MQM would again be foisted upon Sindh, this time with the victorious
PPP in its tow. In view of the PPP's determinedly negative and miss-leading
stand regarding the all important, fundamental and crucial questions of the
restoration of the original judiciary of the Superior Court led by the Chief
Justice Iftikhar Mohd Chaudhry, the necessity of getting rid of the self
chosen President Musharaf and his emergency-imposing, constitution- amending
Parliament and Juduciary-dismissin g powers and of his murderous accomplices
the MQM tormenters of the people of Sindh, it seems that in spite of all the
usual celebrities, the victory-processions and the brave rhetoric of "really
governing" and "changing the system" etc, the victory of PPP in the
elections does not appear to augur any meaningful and fundamental relief to
the oppressed and always betrayed people of Pakistan in general and those of
Sindh in particular.

Sindhi people have not forgotten the shock of their lives they
experienced at the attempted sudden about-turn and complete reversal of the
PPP leadership on the question of resisting the imposition of Kala Bagh dam
immediately following the release of the present co-chairman from jail.

Nothing seems to have changed excepting the replacement of
Musharaf's hypocritical and rhetoric pseudo "liberal and moderate" jargon by
similar rhetorical "radical and revolutionary" jargon.

Unless the patriotic people and workers of Sindh wake-up in
their thousands and millions to the imminent danger, firmly put their feet
down soon enough, and get the course of action corrected and set right, the
aftermath to the electoral exercise threatens to be leading to an imminent
irreversible national disaster for the crores of our peoples who have
hitherto been constantly oppressed, cheated and betrayed by the great
majority of their "chosen representatives" .

Rasul Bux Palijo
palrb2@gmail. com
0333-2198312
0300-3063471
022-2653277
022-2651947
022-2654734

Balochistan's Prisoner of Conscience

Balochistan’s prisoner of conscience
By Sanaullah Baloch

NELSON Mandela who was arrested in 1964 was convicted of sabotage and treason and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Apartheid regime of South Africa. But the world’s most respected and admired statesman — who later won the Nobel Peace Prize — was fortunate that his trial was not held inside the prison. No anti-terrorism court tried him nor was he thrown into an iron cage.

Mandela and his companions were tried in a proper court room. His wife, mother, friends, journalists and supporters were allowed to witness the court proceedings.

Though the Apartheid regime employed the worst form of racial discrimination against native South Africans, no political activist of the ANC went missing or ‘disappeared’ during the struggle against the racist regime. But Akhtar Mengal, a well-known and respected Baloch nationalist, has not been so lucky. For some people in Balochistan he has the status that Mandela had in South Africa.

He has been kept in solitary confinement in Karachi since December 2006. Akhtar Mengal has not been tried in an open court. His trial is conducted inside the prison. No one except one person from his family is allowed to witness the court proceedings. Mr Iqbal Haider, secretary-general of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, witnessed the first hearing of his trial in Karachi prison on special request, and this is what he saw: “Mr Mengal was brought into the courtroom and shoved into an iron cage with bars all around that stood in a corner away from his counsel.”

Akhtar Mengal is not the only political prisoner from a smaller province who has been humiliated or treated as a second class citizen. A number of Baloch, Sindhi and Pashtun leaders have been detained and humiliated repeatedly in the last 60 years.

Veteran Baloch nationalist Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bux Khan Marri, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo, Sher Mohammed Marri and Mir Gul Khan Naseer have spent years in prison for being insubordinate to the establishment. Akhtar Mengal, president of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and former chief minister of Balochistan, has been under detention since Nov 2006, and has been denied justice through delaying tactics. Mengal has not been arrested under corruption charges nor has he been charged with misuse of power. He is not an industrialist who is a bank defaulter. Neither has he been involved in any land scam like many other pro-establishment politicians of the country. He is facing trial for the brief ‘abduction’ of two undercover agents of security agencies.

Mengal’s prolonged detention, mortification and the delay in the dispensation of justice has exposed the inequality that characterises our system. They also point to the inability of our courts to act independently without being influenced by the powers that be.

The Constitution guarantees that “All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law.” The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also emphasises “the right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice”. However, the Baloch have not been treated according to national and international laws. Constitutional guarantees and the courts have failed to protect their fundamental rights.

Akhtar Mengal along with 500 BNP activists was arrested in Nov 2006, a day before President Musharraf’s visit to Balochistan. The mass arrests were aimed at stopping the BNP from protesting peacefully against the military operation, widespread arrests of activists and their enforced ‘disappearance’ .

According to Mr Mengal, his family had been receiving threatening phone calls since the beginning of the military operation in the province. Due to the gravity of the threats he would personally drop his children to school. On April 5, 2006, some unknown persons followed his car presumably to kidnap his school-going children. He stopped his car and asked them who they were. They refused to give any satisfactory answer. Considering this a security issue, Akhtar Mengal’s security guards picked up the two riders of the motorcycle and took them back to the Mengal residence intending to hand them over to the police. At this stage, the two admitted to being army personnel.

Almost immediately, a large party of law-enforcement agency men arrived on the spot and took away their two colleagues who had been picked up, and laid siege to the house and its occupants.

On the intervention of the Sindh chief minister, it was agreed that no case would be filed if Mr Mengal’s guards who were involved in the case were handed over to the police for questioning. At a later stage, it was discovered that a havaldar of the Pakistan army had filed an FIR against Akhtar Mengal and his four guards, who were voluntarily handed over to the police. Yet Akhtar Mengal remained free till Nov 28, 2006, when the Balochistan police arrested him, along with senior members of his party.

Since then, all proceedings are being conducted in camera. Repeated humiliation of the Baloch and their political representatives will intensify the animosity felt by the troubled Baloch population. The judiciary’s tilted role and the unproductive hearings of the ATC have already shattered the credibility of the bench.

Akhtar Mengal, as a senior leader of a political party, is entitled to all basic rights and facilities. But he has been denied basic legal and human rights because of his political affiliations. The large number of political activists in Balochistan, who have been detained and denied legal and prison rights, are entitled to just treatment in accordance with UN conventions. The government of Pakistan must abide by the laws of the country and international law and respect the rights of the Baloch. There should be an end to the injustice, intimidation and harassment being meted out to them.

US civil rights leader Martin Luther King had stated in a letter from Birmingham jail to his friends, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

The writer is a member of the Senate.

balochbnp@gmail. com

http://www.dawn. com/2008/ 02/14/op. htm#3

Mental health crisis in Pakistan

Long Shadows
By Murad Moosa Khan

'When small men cast long shadows, the sun is going down.'
Venita Cravens

On the way to the Hawkes Bay and Sandspit beaches is the village of Grax. Many of us stop here to buy cold drinks and other eatables from the small cabins present on either side of the road. As part of the Community Mental Health programme of my university we used to hold a mental health clinic here every month.

Although by katchi abadi standards, Grax is better than many others, the village has many social, physical and civic deprivations. During one of our visits, the community health worker expressed concern about a girl who appeared 'mentally disturbed'. She lived about a mile from the centre. We went to visit her at her house.

A small cordoned-off area with two small rooms, a small area for the kitchen and a toilet with open drains constituted the 'house' of 75 square yards, perhaps a little more. The father of the girl was unemployed, the elder brother suffering from some sort of 'mental imbalance'. A number of semi-clad children were milling about — presumably brothers and sisters. Their only source of income was a buffalo.

The health worker was right. The girl did appear unwell, "for the past three years," her mother told us, "since the birth of her son". He died a month after being born. The girl talked to imaginary voices, was frightened of others, and laughed to herself. She had run out of the house many times. Unable to afford medicines or have her treated on a regular basis, the family kept her tied to a tree. The result: badly infected wounds with pus and blood oozing out from both ankles.

Long abandoned by her husband — older than her by many years — she now lay on straw matting in the corner of one of the two small rooms, oblivious to her surroundings. She appeared not to have had a wash in weeks. I tried to engage her in conversation but she looked past me, and I was unable to penetrate her secret world. I asked the mother the girl's age. "Fifteen..., " she said; the words echoed in my ears.

While we read about the fabulous growth rate of seven per cent and higher, the Karachi Stock Market making a record 14,000 points, a Porsche showroom opening in Lahore and of the economic 'miracle' that is today's Pakistan, the picture on the ground tells a different story. The story of the girl I related above is illustrative of the lives of millions of Pakistanis today.

Officially, a third of us live below the poverty line. Another quarter probably lives just above it. That makes more than half of 165 million living in poverty. That is a very large number of people. We have become a country of marginalised and disenfranchised people ruled by a small but powerful group of people who have concentrated wealth and power around themselves.

The contradictions in our country are simply astounding. We are a nuclear power but cannot pick the garbage off our streets. We have one of the largest standing military forces in the world, yet cannot provide security to our own people. A report in this newspaper a few weeks ago informed us that Rs65m were spent on the medical treatment of 18 government 'bigwigs'. Yet there are villages in Punjab where every other man is carrying a scar in the lumbar area, because he has had to sell his kidney to pay off his debts.

We have one of the highest rates of child mortality, hepatitis, rabies, depression and cardiovascular diseases. More than 30,000 women die in childbirth and more than 6,000 people commit suicide every year. Millions of our countrymen, women and children are deprived of basic necessities like clean drinking water, housing, education and healthcare. They have no recourse to justice. They have no rights.

This, sadly, is 21st century Pakistan. While many nations of the world move in an upward direction, for every step we take forward we take two back. Underlying all our problems is a serious crisis of governance. Today, corruption in Pakistan is not only institutionalised, it is, more worryingly, internalised as well.

We have no qualms about not paying our taxes or jumping the traffic signal, or asking for bribes. Lying, cheating, cutting corners, trampling on the rights of others, breaking the law and having no remorse afterwards, and corruption have now become part of our national and collective psyche and accepted norms.

This is not only obscene but unethical and immoral. It is immoral to let young mothers die in childbirth as it is not to provide clean drinking water to every household. It is unethical to force people to sell their body parts to pay off debts, as it is to not deal with social conditions that cause people to commit suicide. And it is obscene to buy yet another Lear jet or another tinted glass Mercedes for the use of ministers while hundreds and thousands live in abject poverty.

Is there a way out of this morass? Can the sinking ship of this country be saved? Can something be done to help the young girl in Grax and countless thousands who are suffering in silence like her? Yes, it can and must be. We need to declare an emergency in the education and health sector.

We need to do away with the corrupt feudal system. We need to have respect for the law. And all our processes must be strongly anchored in integrity. Nepotism, favouritism and cronyism should attract the heaviest punishment as should corruption in any form, shape or size. We have no time to lose.

This country was bequeathed by the Quaid to honest, hardworking, law-abiding and decent Pakistanis, and not to the crooked and corrupt who trample on our rights, who have no respect for the law and are a law unto themselves.

Pakistanis deserve better than this. All we want is to live a decent and peaceful life, where our life and property are safe, where our children can go to proper schools, and if they fall sick, receive good medical care. Surely, that is not asking for too much?

Let not the long shadows of small men be cast upon us. Let not the sun go down on this beautiful country that has immense natural and human resources. We have to reclaim it from the corrupt and the crooked. The time to stand on the sidelines for us has long past. We are paying the price of our own impassiveness. We have to raise our collective voice, whether we are doctors or engineers or teachers or lawyers or housewives or students or shopkeepers or businessmen. We have to follow the immortal words of Pablo Neruda who said, "Rise up with me — against the organisation of misery".

The writer is professor of psychiatry at Aga Khan University, Karachi.

muradmk@gmail. com

LPP Analysis of Pakistan Elections

A golden prospect to oust Musharaf

By: Farooq Tariq

Masses have spoken once again. They do not like the military dictatorship. They want Musharaf out. They have acted in their own manner to express their hope to oust Musharaf. Massive anti Musharaf vote on 18 February 2008 across Pakistan speak for itself.

Anyone seems to be supporting the military dictatorship has been punished. The pro Musharaf Muslim League Q (PMLQ) lost badly despite the entire pre poll rigging. The religious fundamentalist parties taking part in the elections were the worst hit. It was an electoral revolution against the military dictatorship. Thanks to the advocates movement that has spearhead the struggle against Musharaf in a different arena.

Contrary to the analysis of many, the boycott campaign by All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) helped anti Musharaf vote to express in a united manner. The tone of all the 18 mass rallies of APDM was anti Musharaf. The boycott campaign was particularly successful in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Here the split in MMA on the question of boycott strategy was the fundamental reason for the victory of Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

If APDM parties would have taken part in the elections, MMA might have been united. In that case, they might not been humiliated the way they have been now. From 13 percent in 2002 general elections, they have gone down to less than five percent. They cannot play any part in any future government’s formation strategy.

If Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf, the Left parties and the nationalist parties of Baluchistan and NWFP who are the main parties behind APDM, were to take part in the general elections, the anti Musharaf vote would have been divided. It may have helped the PMLQ to win some more seats.

It was an all out attack on Musharaf from all fronts. Those boycotting and those participating had one popular slogan in common, “go Musharaf go”.

The advocate’s movement and the courageous stand by the top judges had made Musharaf very unpopular. He did not believed the pre poll surveys, which predicted less than 12 percent support for him.

The defeat of pro Musharaf parties has a lot of parallel to the historic defeat of Bartiya Junta Party (BJP) during the 2004 Indian general elections. The so-called “ India shining” sloganeering was repeated by PMLQ during this election campaign by massive advertisements in the electronic and print media. The “development” at the cost of suffering of human beings will never pay back in political terms is a lesson of this humiliated defeat of PMLQ.

PMLQ leader Choudry Shujaat Hussain was so convinced of his development work in his constituency that he slept in the afternoon of the Election Day. He commented on 16 February 2008 to a private television channel GEO, “I have provided electricity to every village of his constituency, there is no need for more campaign”. He lost both seats that he was contesting. He forgot that while he provided electricity to all the villages of his constituency at the cost of other districts but the prices of every day items had not come down but increased tremendously.

The PMLN landslide in Punjab was due to Nawaz Sharif clear stand on the restoration of the judiciary, lowering of prices and no compromise with Musharaf dictatorship. The demand of restoration of top judges is very popular in Punjab particularly where the advocate movement has been more vocal.

Unfortunately, Pakistan Peoples Party of assassinated Benazir Bhutto hesitated on the question and ultimately decided not to support the demand of restoration of judges. It paid the price in Punjab where despite the entire sympathy wave; PPP was unable to capitalize fully the anti Musharaf vote.

Masses have spoken. Now the leaders of PPP and PMLN have to act accordingly. They must demand an immediate resignation of Musharaf. They must take up the restoration question of judges immediately. They must not share power with Musharaf.

They must change the economic priorities of Musharaf era, the implementation of neo liberal agenda. The masses has suffered a lot because of these polices. There has been unprecedented price hike because of the so-called free market policies. Musharaf has acted upon every advice of IMF and World Bank. His tall claim of economic growth stands absolute exposed.

I wrote an article, “Can Musharaf Survive” on 25 January 2008. It starts from this paragraph,

“It seems that Musharaf is on his last leg. He has become the most detested and despicable president in the history of Pakistan . No longer are there progressives, liberals or moderates in his camp. His enlightened moderation has been buried with the passage of time”.

It goes on, “The Pakistan Muslim league Q (PMLQ), Musharaf favorite, is in absolute crisis after the recent shortages of food items, electricity and gas. The PMLQ candidates are the target of anti-Musharaf consciousness. The general perception is that if you are against Musharaf; do not vote for the PMLQ. Following Benazir assassination, the wave of sympathy has opposed the PMLQ. Unless there is an all-out rigging of the election, there is no guarantee that Musharaf supported candidates will win the election. If Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim league Nawaz (PMLN) candidates gain a majority in the next parliament, Musharaf will find very difficult to repeat what he did following the 2002 election, when he bribed many PMLN and PPP parliamentarians to join hands with the PMLQ to form a majority government”.

It ends on this note, “Boycott, or no boycott, the future scenario seems more and more problematic for Musharaf. His departure seems written on the front door of every home”.

We had understood the processes that were going on among the working class in Pakistan . Unfortunately, the Labour Party Pakistan had not the mass basis to bring this anti Musharaf consciousness to its conclusion, the end of capitalism and feudalism and for a Socialist Pakistan.

LPP along with other Left parties will continue to press demands for the total isolation of military from politics. Those responsible for atrocities under military dictatorships be brought in peoples courts, a real accountability for the generals in politics.

The vote on 18 February is vote of no confidence on Musharaf policies. PPP and PMLN must change the course of economic policies of Musharaf. Otherwise, with a brief period of honeymoon, they will be seen as those who have betrayed the wishes of masses.

The parties of the rich and capitalist, the PPP and PMLN have been able to capitalize on anti Musharaf feelings of the masses. They cannot go very far on the dictations of IMF and World Bank. There is no other alternative but to build a party of the working class. That is what Labour Party Pakistan is all about.

Farooq Tariq
spokesperson
Labour Party Pakistan
40-Abbot Road Lahore, Pakistan
Tel: 92 42 6315162 Fax: 92 42 6271149 Mobile: 92 300 8411945

labour_party@yahoo.com www.laborpakistan.org www.jeddojuhd.com

Pakistan's External Debt

External debt: a false sense of achievement

By Yousuf Nazar

PAKISTAN's official external debt has not gone down since 1999 although it
has received record aid, investments, and remittances flows. It has gone up
to $36.9 billion from $33.6 billion in 1999 despite receiving at least $10
billion in economic, military and development aid from the United States,
over $6 billion in privatisation proceeds, and a relief of $1.6 billion in
loan write-offs by foreign governments during the last seven years.

The rescheduling of Paris Club debts provided an additional relief of
$1.2 to $1.5 billion annually in terms of debt service payments. Is
the government's debt management policy as sound and successful as it claims or
a historic opportunity to restructure country's high debt levels has fallen
victim to political expediency or a false sense of achievement?

Even after having received such generous assistance, Pakistan external debt
to GDP ratio is 28 per cent - slightly worse than Africa's 26.2 per cent,
which also happens to be the average for all the developing countries. The
average external debt to GDP ratio of all emerging markets declined from
42.1 in 1999 to 26.2 per cent in 2006, underpinned by strong growth in the
global economy and record investment flows into the developing countries.

It is argued that the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sahrif left a heavy
external debt burden at 53 per cent of the GDP and the current levels
represent a substantial improvement. The net debt flows (disbursements minus
repayments) into Pakistan during 1990-1999 aggregated $5.4 billion compared
to $1.1 billion during 2000-2006.

Hence, the growth in the debt slowed down during the last seven years.
However, post-9/11, Pakistan received generous foreign aid as well as much
higher levels of foreign direct investment. Remittances averaged around $4
billion a year during 2003-2006 compared to an average of $1.5 billion in
the 1990s.

Nevertheless, Pakistan's liquid foreign exchange reserves, after jumping to
$10 billion-level in 2002-03, have more or less stayed around that level on
average. The foreign exchange reserves of even Sub-Saharan countries
(excluding South Africa and Nigeria) doubled to $50 billion during the same
period. Brazil and Argentina repaid all of their $25 billion debt - by
utilising their foreign exchange reserves - to the IMF in early 2006 to rid
their countries of its influence.

In contrast, Pakistan has not able to reduce the external debt burden in
absolute terms or build up its foreign exchange reserves. In fact, it has
become the fourth largest borrower of the World Bank and the fifth-largest
recipient of American aid to foreign nations. This shows its continued
reliance on foreign governments and multilateral institutions - despite
declarations of economic sovereignty - and a failure to mobilise domestic
resources to pay for the development expenditure. Leaving aside all the
technicalities and vague statements, there has been no convincing
explanation for not having used the privatisation proceeds to reduce the
external debt in a completely transparent manner.

Some policy makers argue that it is acceptable to borrow if the borrowing is
for productive purposes. That is theoretically correct. However, if the
borrowing record is littered with corruption and wasteful spending, and
major sectors of the economy (large agriculturists, stock brokers, property
barons, etc.) do not pay any tax at all, the proposition becomes quite
debateable and the motives questionable.

This is a critical issue for Pakistan's political economy because the
subject of external debt has been a highly political one for most of
Pakistan's history since it has relied heavily on the US and institutions
under the US influence for its external financing needs. So have many other
developing countries - though not necessarily to Pakistan's extent - in the
past but most no longer do. This type of aid has been associated with
corruption, waste and increasing debt burdens. It has even been viewed as a
payoff to the third world dictatorships for their support and aid in helping
the US in achieving its foreign policy objectives that have often clashed
with the national interests of the borrower countries.

For example, the recently proposed US law, aimed at punishing oil companies
that deal with Iran, will make it even more difficult to construct the
Iran-Pakistan- India gas pipeline. Pakistan must import natural gas from Iran
to meet an imminent shortage during the next few years. On the other hand,
recent moves in the US congress threaten to cut military aid to Pakistan if
it fails to 'do more' and stop the Taliban insurgency from its tribal areas.

The government claims that it no longer borrows from the IMF and does not
carry around a begging bowl. This is quite misleading because it has been
borrowing more and more from other multilateral institutions like the World
Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The borrowing from
multilaterals has outpaced the borrowing from the Paris Club since
1999-2000. Its share in total public and publicly guaranteed debt has
increased from 37.5 to 50.2 per cent in 2006.

Consequently, official sources still account for 90 per cent of Pakistan's
external debt, including the WB/ADB [48 per cent] and foreign governments
[38 per cent]. IMF's loans rarely exceeded 5-6 per cent of total external
debt as it normally provided the balance of payments support and not
long-term loans that constitute the bulk of our external debt.

The present government has criticised the previous governments for the
accumulation of almost $18 billion debt in the 1990s and increasing
Pakistan's debt burden. While it is true that the debt accumulation in the
1990s was large, critics of the civilian governments conveniently overlook a
key statistic: 77.2 per cent of the gross disbursements during 1990-1999
were utilised to repay the old debts. The debt-service to gross disbursement
ratio jumped to 82.8 per cent during 2005-2006. The continuing increase in
this key ratio throughout the 1990s and even during 2000-2006 indicates that
more and more of new loan disbursements were used to repay the past debts; a
significant percentage relating to the borrowings during the previous
military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq.

Pakistan's total external debt that stood at $8.7 billion in 1978, reached
about $22 billion (50 per cent of the GDP) by the end of the 1980s. That
Pakistan had to borrow more later in the 1990s just to service some of the
old debts indicates that the loans were not properly utilised as they did
not contribute to the development and therefore to the debt servicing
capacity. This raises serious questions about the whole wisdom of
politically motivated borrowings from the foreign governments and the
institutions under their control.

Pakistan's vicious cycle of borrowings from foreign governments and
multilateral institutions, graft, waste, and accumulation of more debt to
repay the old debts leads one to believe that the rulers have been putting
excessive burden on the people and mortgaging their future by borrowing more
and more while indulging in wasteful and unproductive spending while the
'big fish' get away with not only benefiting from the 'development projects'
financed by external borrowings but also with paying no taxes.

Pakistan's foreign (or hard currency) debt to total debt (that is, including
domestic debt) ratio of 47 per cent is high compared to an average of 28 per
cent for emerging economies. Given our long-term track record of using
foreign debt to indulge in wasteful expenditure, it would be in the best
national interest to set up a special fund (in a hard currency, be it dollar
or euro) to accumulate all the privatisation proceeds and use that for the
early retirement of our external debt. Some countries, like Russia, have set
up hard currency stabilization funds to provide for the rainy days.

Source: http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/12/ebr2.htm

Strategic Forecasting Report on Pakistani Jihadis

[Blog Managers disclaimer: Linda and Ray do not endorse the conclusions in this report. We are reposting the article because we belive it contains useful information about the power structures in the Pakistan military and the political relations between Jihadists and military.]

Strategic Forecasting logo
The Jihadist Insurgency in Pakistan
February 6, 2008 | 1616 GMT
Graphic for Terrorism Intelligence Report

By Kamran Bokhari

The increasing crisis of governance in Pakistan over the past several
months has triggered many queries from Stratfor readers, most wanting to
know how events will ultimately play out. Would a collapse of the
Musharraf regime lead to a jihadist takeover? How safe are the country’s
nuclear weapons? What are the security implications for Afghanistan?
Topmost among the questions is whether Pakistan will remain a viable state.

Globally, there are fears that the collapse of the current regime could
lead to an implosion of the state itself, with grave repercussions on
regional and international security. Pakistanis themselves are very much
concerned about a disaster of national proportions, particularly if the
Feb. 18 elections go awry.

Although there are conflicting theories on what will happen in and to
Pakistan, most have one thing in common. They focus on the end result,
seeing the unfolding events as moving in a straight line from Point A to
Point B. They deem Point B — the collapse of Pakistan — to be an
unavoidable outcome of the prevailing conditions in the country. Such
predictions, however, do not account for the many arrestors and other
variables that will influence the chain of events.

Though there are many, many reasons for concern in Pakistan, state
breakdown is not one of them. Such an extreme outcome would require the
fracturing of the military and/or the army’s loss of control over the
core of the country — neither of which is about to happen. That said,
the periphery of the country, especially the northwestern border
regions, could become an increasing challenge to the writ of the state.

We have said on many occasions that Islamabad is unlikely to restore
stability and security any time soon, largely because of structural
issues. In other words, the existing situation is likely to persist for
some time — and could even deteriorate further. This raises the
question: How bad can things get?

The answer lies in the institutional cohesiveness of Pakistan’s military
establishment and the geographical structure of the country.
The Army

Stratfor recently pointed out that the army — rather than any particular
military general — is the force that holds the state together.
Therefore, the collapse of the state would come about only if the
military establishment were to fracture. For several reasons, this is
extremely unlikely.

Pakistan’s army is a highly disciplined organization made up of roughly
half a million personnel. This force usually is led by at least two
four-star generals — the chief of the army staff and chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The leadership also consists of nine
corps commanders and several other principal staff officers — all
three-star generals. Beneath these approximately 30 lieutenant generals
are about 150 two-star generals and some 450 one-star generals.

Moreover, and unlike in the Arab world, the Pakistani army has largely
remained free of coups from within. The generals know their personal
well-being is only as good as their collective ability to function as a
unified and disciplined force — one that can guarantee the security of
the state. The generals, particularly the top commanders, form a very
cohesive body bound together by individual, corporate and national
interests.

It is extremely rare for an ideologue, especially one with Islamist
leanings, to make it into the senior ranks. In contrast with its Turkish
counterpart, the Pakistani military sees itself as the protector of the
state’s Islamic identity, which leaves very little room for the officer
corps to be attracted to radical Islamist prescriptions. Thus, it is
extremely unlikely that jihadism — despite the presence of jihadist
sympathizers within the junior and mid-level ranks — will cause fissures
within the army.

In the absence of strong civilian institutions, the army also sees
itself as the guardian of the republic. Because of the imbalance in
civil-military relations — there is virtually no civilian oversight over
the military — the army exercises nearly complete control over the
nation’s treasury. Having directly ruled Pakistan for some 33 years of
the country’s 60-year existence, the army has become a huge corporation
with massive financial holdings.

While these interests are a reason for the army’s historical opposition
to democratic forces, they also play a major role in ensuring the
cohesiveness of the institution. Consequently, there is no danger of the
state collapsing. By extension, it is highly unlikely that the country’s
nuclear assets (which are under the control of the military through an
elaborate multilayered institutional mechanism) would fall into the
wrong hands.

Although a collapse of the state is unlikely, the military is having a
hard time running the country. This is not simply because of political
instability, which is hardwired into Pakistan’s hybrid political system,
but rather because of the unprecedented jihadist insurgency.

While civilian forces (political parties, civil society groups, the
media and the legal community) are pushing for democratic rule,
jihadists are staging guerrilla-style attacks in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the rural Pashtun districts of the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Moreover, they are mounting a
campaign of suicide bombings in major urban centers. The military does
not have the bandwidth to deal with political unrest and militancy
simultaneously — a situation that is being fully exploited by the
jihadists. The likely outcome of this trend is the state’s relative loss
of control over the areas in the northwestern periphery.
Geography and Demography

From a strictly geopolitical point of view, Pakistan’s core is the area
around the Indus River, which runs from the Karakoram/Western
Himalayan/Pamir/ Hindu Kush mountain ranges in the North to the Arabian
Sea in the South. Most areas of the provinces of Punjab and Sindh lie
east of the Indus. The bulk of the population is in this area, as is the
country’s agricultural and industrial base — not to mention most of the
transportation infrastructure. The fact that seven of the army’s nine
corps are stationed in the region (six of them in Punjab) speaks volumes
about its status as the core of the country.

In contrast, the vast majority of the areas in the NWFP, FATA,
Balochistan province, the Federally Administered Northern Areas and
Pakistani-administe red Kashmir are sparsely populated mountainous
regions — and clearly the country’s periphery. Moreover, their rough
terrain has rendered them natural buffers, shielding the core of the
country.

In our 2008 Annual Forecast for South Asia, we said the country’s
Pashtun areas could become ungovernable this year, and there already are
signs that the process is under way. Pakistani Taliban supported by al
Qaeda have seized control of many parts of the FATA and are asserting
themselves in the districts of NWFP adjacent to the tribal areas.

While Islamism and jihadism can be found across the country, the bulk of
this phenomenon is limited to the Pashtun areas — the tribal areas, the
eastern districts of NWFP and the northwestern corridor of Balochistan
province. Unlike the vast majority of Pakistanis, the Pashtuns are
disproportionately an ultra-conservative lot (both religiously and
culturally), and hence are disproportionately more susceptible to
radical Islamist and jihadist impulses. It is quite telling that in the
last elections, in 2002, this is roughly the same area in which the
Islamist alliance, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), won the bulk of
its seats in the national legislature. In addition to maintaining a
large parliamentary bloc, the MMA ran the provincial government in NWFP
and was the main partner with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League
in the coalition government in Balochistan.

Social structures and local culture, therefore, allow these areas to
become the natural habitat of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Because of the
local support base, the jihadists have been able not only to operate in
these parts, but to take them over — and even to project themselves into
the more settled areas of the NWFP. In addition to this advantage by
default, security operations, which are viewed by many within the
country as being done at the behest of the United States, have
increasingly alienated the local population.

Given the local culture of retribution, the Pashtun militants have
responded to civilian deaths during counterinsurgency operations by
increasingly adopting suicide bombings as a means of fighting back. (It
was not too long ago that the phenomenon of suicide bombings was alien
to the local culture). The war in Afghanistan and its spillover effect
on the border regions of Pakistan have created conditions in the area
that have given al Qaeda and the Taliban a new lease on life.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Resentment first toward Islamabad’s pro-U.S. policies and then the
security crackdown that began in early 2004 to root out foreign fighters
has developed into a general uprising of sorts. A younger, far more
militant generation of Pashtuns enamored of al Qaeda and the Taliban has
usurped power from the old tribal maliks. Not only has the government
failed to achieve its objective of driving a wedge between foreign
fighters and their local hosts, it has strengthened the militants’ hand.

One of the problems is the government’s haphazard approach of
alternating military operations with peace deals. Moreover, when the
government has conducted security operations, it not only has failed to
weaken the militancy, it has caused civilian casualties and/or forced
local people to flee their homes, leading to a disruption of life. When
peace agreements are made, they have not secured local cooperation
against Taliban and al Qaeda elements. The lack of a coherent policy on
how to deal with the jihadists has caused the ground situation to go
from bad to worse. At the same time, on the external front, Islamabad
has come under even more U.S. pressure to act against the militants, the
effects of which further complicate matters on the ground.

On a tactical level, while the Pakistani army has a history of
supporting insurgencies, it is ill-equipped to fight them. Even worse,
despite the deployment of some 100,000 soldiers in the region, the bulk
of security operations have involved paramilitary forces such as the
Frontier Corps, which is mostly made up of locals who have little
incentive to fight their brethren. Furthermore, Pakistan’s intelligence
capabilities already are compromised because of militant penetration of
the agencies.

In addition to these structural problems, the Musharraf government’s
battle for political survival over the past year has further prevented
the government from focusing on the jihadist problem. The only time it
acted with any semblance of resolve is when it sent the army to regain
control of the Red Mosque in the summer of 2007. However, that action
was tantamount to pouring more fuel on the militant fire.

President Pervez Musharraf, by stepping down as army chief and becoming
a civilian president, did not resolve his survival issues. In fact, it
has led to a bifurcation of power, with Musharraf sharing authority with
his successor in the militaryGen. Ashfaq Kayani. While Musharraf remains
preoccupied with making it through the coming election, Kayani is
increasingly taking charge of the fight against jihadism. The
assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto further complicated
the regime’s struggle to remain in power, leaving very little bandwidth
for dealing with the jihadists.
What Lies Ahead

With the army’s successful retaking of the district of Swat from
militants loyal to Mullah Fazlullah, Kayani has demonstrated his
abilities as a military leader. Despite this tactical victory, however,
the situation is far from stable. From a strategic point of view,
Kayani’s plans to deal with the insurgency depend heavily on the outcome
of the Feb. 18 elections (if indeed they are held). The hope is that the
political turmoil can be brought back within acceptable parameters so
the army can focus on fighting jihadists.

That would be an ideal situation for the army, because the prevailing
view is that the military needs public support in order to be successful
in combating religious extremism and terrorism. Such public support can
only be secured when an elected government comprising the various
political stakeholders is in charge. The assumption is that the policies
of such a government would be easier to implement and that if the army
has to use a combination of force and negotiations with the militants,
it will have the public’s backing instead of criticism.

But the problem is that there is an utter lack of national consensus on
what needs to be done to defeat the forces of jihadism, beyond the
simplistic view that the emphasis should be on dialogue and force should
be used sparingly. Most people believe the situation has deteriorated
because the Musharraf regime was more concerned with meeting U.S.
demands than with finding solutions that took into consideration the
realities on the ground. Islamabad knows it cannot avoid the use of
force in dealing with the militants, but because of public opposition to
such action, it fears that doing so could make the situation even worse.

Moreover, regardless of the election outcome (assuming the process is
not derailed over cries of foul play), the prospects for a national
policy on dealing with the Islamist militancy are slim. Circumstances
will require that the new government be a coalition — thus it will be
inherently weak. This, along with the deteriorating ground reality, will
leave the army with no choice but to adopt a tough approach — one it has
been avoiding for the most part.

Having led the country’s premier intelligence directorate,
Inter-Services Intelligence, Kayani is all too aware of the need to
overhaul the country’s intelligence system and root out militant
sympathizers. This is the principal way to reduce the jihadists’ ability
to stage attacks in the core areas of the country, where they have
limited support structure. While this lengthy process continues, the
army will try to contain the jihadist phenomenon on the western
periphery along the border with Afghanistan.

The Pakistani government also needs to address the problems it has
created for itself by distinguishing between “acceptable” and
“unacceptable” Taliban. Islamabad continues to support the Taliban in
Afghanistan while it is at war with the Pakistani Taliban. Given the
strong ties between the two militant groups, Islamabad cannot hope to
work with those on the other side of the border while it confronts those
in its own territory.

Further complicating matters for Islamabad is the U.S. move to engage in
overt military action on Pakistani soil in an effort to root out
transnational jihadist elements. The Pakistanis need U.S. assistance in
fighting the jihadist menace, but such assistance comes at a high
political cost on the domestic front. The ambiguity in the Pakistani
position could allow the Taliban and al Qaeda to thrive.

What this ultimately means is that the Pashtun areas could experience a
long-term insurgency, resulting in some of these areas being placed
under direct military rule. With the militants already trying to create
their own “Islamic” emirate in the tribal areas, the insurgency has the
potential to transform into a separatist struggle. Historically, the
Pakistani army tried to defeat Pashtun ethnic nationalism by promoting
Islamism — a policy that obviously has backfired miserably.
The Bottom Line

The good news for the Pakistanis — and others interested in maintaining
the status quo — is that the ongoing jihadist insurgency and the
political turmoil are unlikely to lead to the collapse of the state. The
structure of the state and the nature of Pakistani society is such that
radical Islamists, though a significant force, are unlikely to take over
the country.

On the other hand, until the army successfully cleans up its
intelligence system, suicide bombings are likely to continue across the
country. Much more significant, the Pashtun areas along the Afghan
border will be ungovernable. Pashtun jihadists and their transnational
allies on both sides of the Durand Line will continue to provide mutual
benefit until Pakistan and NATO can meaningfully coordinate their efforts.

Imposing a military solution is not an option for the Pakistanis or for
the West. Negotiations with the Taliban in the short term are not a
viable alternative either. Therefore, a long-term insurgency, which is
confined to the Pashtun areas on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani
border, is perhaps the best outcome that can be expected at this time.

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Modern Day Slavery?

Bonded Labour in Pakistan's Brick Industry

By Ray Fulcher and Linda Waldron

Lahore – In December 2004 we accompanied Mahmoud Butt, field co-coordinator for the Pakistan Brick Kiln Workers Union (PBKWU), to a brick factory on the outskirts of Lahore. There we met families of workers, including children as young as four, that labour in these brick factories for below poverty line wages and who are regularly bought and sold by the factory owners.

The number of brick factories and their workers in Pakistan is uncertain and collating this data is a priority task for the PBKWU. Some data is available and, as an example, in the two districts that cover Lahore (there are 10 districts in Pakistan) the following figures have been confirmed by the union:

Lahore South:
Factories – 222
Women workers – 21 090
Male workers – 17 760
Child workers – 14 430

Lahore East:
Factories – 301
Women workers – 27 090
Male workers – 21 070
Child workers – 24 080

All brick factories and their workers are supposed to be registered by the government. Registration confers some government benefits and workers are able to access social security benefits if registered. Yet, according to the union, 85% of the factories and their workers remain unregistered. One of the first actions of the union when it comes to a new factory is to ascertain from the workers whether the factory if registered. If it is not they organise the workers to take protest action in support of registration

The workers are paid at piece rates for the number of bricks they produce. The minimum wage board of government had decided in 1998 that they be provided for a payment rate of at least184 rupees per 1000 bricks, previously there had been no legal protection for brick kiln workers. According to Mahmoud the workers are currently only paid 100-130 rupees per 1000 bricks. This amount is only paid to the male head of the family, whereas the whole family – men, women and children – will work.

In a day, working from 6am to 7pm, a family can produce between 1000 to 1500 bricks. When sold on the open market the factory owner will receive around 3000 rupees for a 1000 bricks. One of the union’s top demands is for a rate increase to at least 350 rupees per 1000 bricks.

Another of the union’s demands is for the abolition of bonded labour in the industry. The Pakistan government legislated an end to bonded labour in 1992. However, no effect was given to this law and the PBKWU says that 80-90% of the brick kiln workers are bonded laborers. They commonly have a 30 000 – 50 000 rupee debt to be paid off to their employers. The factory owners often work their labourers for one year then sell them on to another factory, often in another district. The workers at one factory also told us that it was common for employers to imprison those they considered potential “flight risks” and that they had cells at the factories for this purpose.

An ex-brick kiln worker we met in Toba Tek Singh (in Punjab about 4 hours from Lahore) told us he had fled a particularly onerous brick factory in Lahore and the employer was still holding and working his wife and seven children. The case became a nationally known when the BKWU filed a writ petition in Lahore High Court on behalf of this Toba brik kiln worker that his eight children must be produced. The court ordered the police officer in charge of the area to produce the children. He tried to fool the court three times he was called by the court that he can not find the children.

The court in a historic decision agreed with Rabia Bajwa, the union advocate, that it is responsibility of the state to find the children. The court ordered the arrest of the police officers within the courtroom until the children are produced. On 13th January, five out of seven children including the mother were released. The Union addressed a press conference on 14th January to demand the release of the rest of the children.

The workers must rent sub-standard housing at the kiln site from the factory owners and pay exorbitant rates for power and water. In one factory the workers were paying around 600 rupees per month to power a single light bulb.

According to Mahmoud the union is campaigning on a number of key demands. These include: registration of all brick factories, abolition of child labour, for age and disability pensions, worker involvement in setting rates, an end to violence against women and abolition of bonded labour and bond debts.

The union faces difficulties in organising such a large and diverse industry, especially given that due to their financial limitations they can currently only afford one field co-ordinator.

Zero fervor for elections

Zero fervor for elections

By: Farooq Tariq

Thirteen days to go and yet there is no election excitement. There are no street corner meetings or large-scale public rallies. The main leadership of those parties participating in the elections plan no national tours. It could be the most colorless election in the history of Pakistan.

The reasons are simple: General Musharraf wanted it that way. Before announcing the date for the general elections, he imposed martial law. He arrested over 10,000 political activists and lawyers, removed all the top judges, amended the constitution and got himself elected as 'civilian' president. He wanted five more years in power.

General Musharraf's allies made all the arrangement to 'win' e elections before announcing the date. They wanted a snap election where the opposition would have no time to mobilizing its base. It was to be a general election held without an independent judiciary, with a dependent Election Commission, and with repression still alive. This was the ideal circumstance for a 'win'.

Pressured by American and British imperialism, Musharraf was forced to implement a power-sharing deal with the Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). However, supporters of military rule, having enjoyed all the power during Mussharraf's first eight years, opposed the deal, dragged their heels and set up hurdles.

Following Musharraf's imposition of emergency law, the lawyers' movement rightly demanded that political parties boycott the fraudulent election. The majority agreed, including former prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his Muslim League (PMLN). But the PPP kept its bargain and Benazir Bhutto began her vigorous campaign. It was her unfortunate assassination on 27 December 2007 that shocked the whole world. Had the PPP leadership then demanded Musharraf's immediate resignation, he would be gone by now.

Following Benazir's assassination the PPP leadership wanted to cash in on sympathy votes and demanded that the 8 January election not be postponed. Nonetheless the Election Commission proposed the general elections until 18 February 2008, providing Musharraf supporters with a breathing space.

The mass reaction after Benazir Bhutto's death opened the lid on the economic crisis: There was shortage of everything, from wheat flour to electricity. Musharraf's claim that he provided eight years of uninterrupted economic boom was shattered within few days. The long queues in front of public Utility Stores across Pakistan revealed the desperate situation the masses were living in.

The lawyers' movement did not retreat. It has continued to demand the release and reinstatement of the country's top judges. They are still actively supported by civil society organizations and the students. Despite the reality that the lawyers' demand is one of the most popular issues of the day, both the PPP and PMLN decided to participate in the February general election.

The combination of Benazir Bhutto's assassination, the economic crisis and the boycott appeal of both the lawyers movement and the All Parties Democratic Movement has minimized election fervor. If the 18 February election does take place, the PPP will get a massive sympathy vote from those going to the polls. But not much will change because the PPP leadership has already made it clear that it is willing to work with Musharraf. The PPP has nothing to offer to the people of Pakistan. It believes in privatization and it is happy to go along with the imperialist policies for the region. In fact this is not a new turn for the PPP; it has gone along with these policies for long time. The same is true for Nawaz Sharaf's PMLN. In fact all those participating in the elections share one common goal with Musharraf: a continuation of the present economic 'reforms'.

All those on the Left who expected an election where there would be a mobilization of masses and, consequently, a chance to work among them must be very disappointed. This is not an ordinary general election. This is a very calculated plot on the part of the Musharraf dictatorship to continue for the next five years with the collaboration of those who will be 'elected'. This is not an election that can mobilize the masses to build a movement that could overthrow the dictatorship after the elections.

But there is a growing movement against the military dictatorship. The Pakistan Peoples Party is paying the price of its participation in the election, at least among the most active strata of society. The PPP lawyers once had the support of over 80 percent of Bar Association of Pakistan. However, recent Bar Association election results reveal an opposite trend. The Lahore Bar Association elections show that the PPP-nominated president got less than 400 votes. The Awami Jamhoori Tehreek, (the Left alliance) candidate received 1075 and lost by less than 100 votes. The brother of 'Marxist' PPP former Member of Parliament (the Ted Grant group) was also badly defeated for Qasur Bar Association president. The Labour Party Pakistan Punjab chairperson received the highest number of votes for the executive board.

At the Multan High Court Bar Association meeting on 4 February, the Bar's president attempted to defend the PPP decision to participate in the fraudulent February election, agitating lawyers forced him to stop speaking. Earlier, in another incident at Lahore University of Management, the PPP and PMLN representatives had to face angry students and civil society activists who were shouting for a total boycott.

So far the election campaign is limited to newspaper and television advertisements, billboards, stickers, banners and posters. There are no local public meetings. Unlike in the past, the candidates' temporary offices look deserted. The PPP is counting on sympathy votes and it believes that it does not need a mass public campaign, as was the case in the past. At the same time both the PPP and PMLN are already complaining about Musharraf's supporters plan to rig the vote. The lethargy toward this election is a phenomenon that deserves serious examination. How many would go to the polls has to be seen, but it is clear from all indicators that it will be the most hollow election in the history of Pakistan.

Farooq Tariq
spokesperson Labour Party Pakistan
40-Abbot Road Lahore, Pakistan
Tel: 92 42 6315162 Fax: 92 42 6271149 Mobile: 92 300 8411945
labour_party@ yahoo.com www.laborpakistan. org www.jeddojuhd. com

Interview with Progressive Professor on Student Activism

Shah Hussain College was the first institution in Pakistan to introduce Professor Manzour Ahmed in Punjabi. The Punjabi University followed and opened the Punjabi department, and adopted our MA Punjabi class. Najm Hussain Syed, who was chairman of the department at Shah Hussain was appointed the first chairman of the Punjab university Punjabi department.

Shah Hussain College staff and students worked together and established the third open air theatre in Lahore. The other two open theatres were in Lawrence Gardens and Government College. Independent groups from all over Lahore used the theatre for their performances.

Under Dictator Zia ul Haq, the students of the college were scattered as commerce classes and arts classes to other colleges; the staff were scattered all over the Punjab.

Comment by Amin Mughal


Interview
Activist of another time
The news on Sunday 27/1/2008

By Aoun Sahi and Ali Sultan

Professor Manzur Ahmed does not look or feel his 82 years. Born in Baghdad in 1926 and hailing from a family from Amristar, he started his teaching career in 1952, teaching postgraduate students psychology at Islamia College, FC College and retired from MAO College Lahore after 35 years worth of teaching experience.

Dr Manzur has lived all his life in Lahore. Rarely has his life been without cause, from being an active participant in a teachers' and students' movement to being charged in the first ever case against teachers by the then government and then setting up of the first liberal arts college, Shah Hussain College, Dr Manzur is not only a highly respected teacher and scholar but also a man with a great sense of wit. Excerpts of the interview are as follows:

The News On Sunday: Can you tell us a little about the history of student activism in Pakistan?

Manzur Ahmed: The very first student outcry was in 1948, Dhaka. Mohammed Ali Jinnah said then that Urdu would be our national language and the language of education. It was then that students protested for the first time. One of those students was Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman.

The second student movement started in Karachi in 1951-52, which voiced concerns over having very few educational institutions and high fees.

At the same time (Ayub era) students protested against the 'three year degree course,'. Most of the two year syllabus was spread onto three years, which meant more money would have to be spent by students. I was also among the committee of experts that devised the three year degree course. This was a bad time; students were pressurised, and a lot of them went underground. But they met with success; the demand to reverse it into a two year course was accepted in 1961-62.

Students and teachers also protested against the 'University Ordinance' of 1963-64, which was very oppressive. Among other things, teachers' services could be terminated without citing a reason or notice.

Students also protested against the 'Tashkent declaration' of 1966 during Ayub era.

TNS: There was also a strong network of teachers aligned with the Left involved in politics in those days?

MA: There was a loose informal co-ordination of teachers. Teachers' politics was at its foetal stage. We all were trying for educational reforms. Punjab Teachers' Union (established pre-partition) was very prominent on the school level and was the only registered trade union for teachers in the country.

Another prominent organisation was the lecturers' association in Government College and there were other small university staff academic associations all over the country.

I was a part of a teachers' association known as the West Pakistan College Teachers' Association (WPTA) which was a prominent well connected organisation, whose members included teachers of non-government colleges from all provinces.

We made this organisation because we felt the government had started imposing itself in education. It was already involved in making of the syllabus, but we wanted academic freedom -- to structure education from beginning to end. It was not the government's job, to plan and implement education -- it was the teachers. We had even given a call "Taleem ek nataqseem amal hai -- All teachers unite"

Our political demand was that there should be an autonomous education commission comprising only of teachers who would solve all problems dealing with education and then recommend solutions that the government would fund. Meaning that there would be no government intervention. This did not go well with the establishment. The government was alarmed and filed a case against some teachers for conducting un-Islamic activities.

This was during the Yahya period, and such prominent teachers such as Eric Cyprian, Amin Mughal, Zahoor Ahmed and I [Dr Manzur Ahmed was then president of WPTA] were named in the case.

Let me tell you, this case is the only example of 'McCarthyism' you will find in our history. There was a lot of national and international coverage; I even remember a headline 'Teachers in the dock.'

But in the end, Eric was suspended and Amin and I were terminated. After the case, the teachers' movement as a whole faltered.

When the government is democratic, things like these don't matter. Everyone understands that things move on, but when there is dictatorship, everything seems like a threat.

TNS: But wasn't the Left strong then?

MA: The left was never very strong. Communism and Marxism are not fit for a religious state. In that era, organisations that represented the Left were prominent only because religious outfits were not, then. They had no presence as such in the government.

TNS: Would you like to tell us something about the highly influential Shah Hussain College?

MA: Yes, after we were barred from teaching at state institutions, I along with Amin Mughal and Eric Cyprian opened the Shah Hussain College in 1969. It was a small college but it was special, because we taught without having a fixed syllabus and for the first time students and teachers could freely express themselves. Before that, close contact between teachers and students was discouraged. All known teachers taught there, we had the likes of Dr Mohammed Ajmal who was the ex-principal of Government College and Dr Nazir Ahmed as the chairman of our education committee. We also gave vocational training in subjects such as dramatics, journalism and debates which back then was unheard off. It was thought to be an important cultural college.

TNS: What happened then?

MA: When Bhutto came into power, he nationalised education in 1972, and the college went under state control. But many teachers wanted education to be nationalised. You see, our worries were not only academic, we also wanted better wages. Teachers, after that, got better grades. I even remember, many teachers marched in their traditional gowns on the Mall in favour of nationalisation.

Bhutto was the one who gave education to the poor. Books were cheap; education itself became available to everyone. But everything detracted when Zia came. Education went downhill.

TNS: It was when some students became extremely violent. Wasn't it?

MA: Yes, it was a sad time. Zia favoured rightist student groups for his own motives. This was the first time that weapons came into student politics. There were two prominent groups, Islami Jamiat-Tulaba (IJT)and the Muslim Student Federation, which had severe clashes. They had dealings in arms, narcotics and started extorting money. The so-called students of the liberal left were kicked out of institutions. There are stories of how these groups would take over hostels and physically torture other students. A lot of students were killed. There was no control over this and it continued for years.

MQM also emerged then as a student movement as APMSO (All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization) in 1978, under the patronage of the government. The campuses were filled with arms, and its effects reverberate till now.

TNS: What did you think of the lawyers' movement and the revival of student protest?

MA: Well, movements like these don't happen in a vacuum. They always have a context. At one point, it looked as if it could have knocked out Musharraf, but it didn't because political movements need political leaders. I don't see a political movement that will take us in the right direction. These people who are leading us are not the right people. Political movements are made by taking bullets in the chest. Where is politics now? This is just power-grabbing.

TNS: Do you think students should participate in politics?

MA: Absolutely! Even the British gave that relaxation; a teacher could think politically and students had organisations. We remember the British rule as an oppressive time, but they gave us our educational structure that we follow till today. Weren't Jinnah, Nehru and Gandhi all products of British education?

Kalabagh Dam: Death of the Indus?

PAKISTAN: Kalabagh dam threatens livelihood of millions
15 March 2006
Ray Fulcher
Green Left Weekly

Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf’s government plans to commence construction of a massive dam in 2016 on the Indus river at Kalabagh, near the border between the Punjab and North West Frontier provinces. Opponents of the World Bank-funded dam project see it as another grab for water by the Punjabi ruling elite, which dominates federal politics in Pakistan.
The government claims that the dam is necessary for Pakistan's economic development, that it will provide 3600 megawatts of hydroelectric power and 35,000 jobs.

Musharraf has said that the dam project will proceed against any opposition and that the federal and Punjabi governments will topple any provincial government that opposes the project. Of Pakistan's four provinces, three provincial parliaments — North West Frontier (NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan — have passed resolutions opposing the dam.

On December 31 2005, four progressive parties in Punjab united to protest against the proposed dam. The rally, held in Lahore, was charged by police, and activists of the four parties — the National Workers Party, the Labour Party Pakistan (LPP), the Pakistan Mazdoor Mehaz and the Mazdoor Kissan Party — were beaten.

Farooq Tariq, an organiser of the rally and national secretary of the LPP told Green Left Weekly by phone: “The LPP opposes the dam because it will deny Sindh its share of water and turn it into a desert. We oppose the construction of big dams on environmental grounds. Furthermore, this dam will benefit the Punjab ruling class and will add to the exploitation of Sindh. All provinces except the Punjab have repeatedly opposed the construction of this dam. This democratic verdict should be taken as a referendum and the dam abandoned.
“For the dam to proceed, especially under an unelected, military dictatorship, is a violation of all democratic norms.”

Two days earlier, protesters at Jehangira, 60 kilometres east of Peshawar, closed the Grand Trunk road between Peshawar in the NWFP and the country's capital Islamabad for seven hours. That rally was organised by the Awami National Party (ANP) and was attended by representatives of almost all political parties, including the Pakistan People's Party, an ally of Musharraf.

The Mutehida Majlas Amal, a coalition of Islamic fundamentalist organisations that form the provincial government of the NWFP, also sent representatives to the rally.
ANP president Asfandyar Wali Khan told the rally: “Pakistan and Kalabagh dam cannot co-exist”. He said that proceeding with the dam against the wishes of three provinces could lead to a “1971-like situation”, referring to the civil war that saw east Pakistan split off to form Bangladesh.
“We are opposed to the disintegration of the country, but if the establishment is bent on drowning its own people — then we will choose how we want to die”, he said.

The Musharraf regime already faces an insurgency in Balochistan — ostensibly over inequitable treatment of the Balochi people and diverting resources from that province.
In March 2005, a “Long March” of 500km ended in a rally of 100,000 opponents of the dam in Karachi, Sindh's capital.
As early as June 1998, the day after the dam project was announced, protests of thousands of people around the country erupted against the proposal and protests throughout the country have continued since then.
To understand the passion that this dam arouses it is necessary to understand the importance of the Indus river system to Pakistan and the effects the dam will have on the workers and peasants of Pakistan.

Importance of Indus River

The Indus River originates some 5000 metres above sea level in the glaciers of the northern slopes of Kailash Parbat in Tibet collecting melting snow and rainwater from a wide catchment area. Flowing north-west through Ladakh-Baltistan into Gilgit just south of the Karakoram range it gradually turns south into Jammu-Kashmir, coming out of the hills between Peshawar and Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

On its 2900km journey to the Arabian Sea, the Indus is augmented by 10 major rivers and passes through the Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan.

Pakistan depends almost entirely on the Indus river system for its irrigated agriculture. Two-thirds of the country’s 200 million inhabitants depend on the erratic flows of the Indus for their water needs and millions are directly or indirectly reliant on the river for their livelihoods. It is not surprising therefore that water distribution and control of the Indus and its canal system has always loomed large in Pakistan's politics.

Indeed the dispute over the Indus' water goes back before the creation of Pakistan to the 1870s when conflict erupted between Sindh and Punjab over the latter’s construction of irrigation infrastructure on the Indus. By 1945 the British colonial rulers had imposed a solution on the two provinces whereby the right of Sindh to receive the waters of the Indus was held supreme. This arrangement continued until 1977 when the federal government of Pakistan began an ad-hoc process of water apportionment between provinces, which favoured distribution to the Punjab.

Disputes between the provinces and the federal government over water allocation led to the signing of the Indus Water Accord in March 1991.

Under the accord the provinces were allocated a certain percentage of “balance river supply” which accounted for the need for a minimum flow through of water to the sea. Under the accord, the allocations were Punjab 37%, Sindh 37%, the NWFP 14% and Balochistan 12% of available supply. Water shortages and surpluses were thus to be shared equitably among the four provinces.

However, in May 1994 the Punjab government proposed a different formula for water distribution. Known as the “historical uses formula”, this used as its baseline for calculating “historical uses” of water the 13-year period 1977-90 — the period during which the federal government's ad-hoc distribution in favour of the Punjab was in force.
Punjab’s proposal was found by the courts to be a breach not only of the accord but of the country’s constitution.

However, using its physical control over canal heads and dams, as well as other measures, the Punjab government has been able to impose its formula for water allocation on the rest of Pakistan, an allocation that favours Punjab.
This inequitable distribution of water is set to become worse with construction of the Kalabagh dam.

The Kalabagh dam site

The dam site is close to the massive Kohat and Khewra salt ranges, the latter containing the oldest operating salt mine in the world. The leaching of large quantities of salt from these ranges into the river system as a result of ground saturation and changes to hydrology in the region because of the dam are major concerns for opponents.

Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) puts the total cultivable land to be permanently submerged as a result of the dam at around 14,000 hectares. However, independent assessments have put the figure as high as 74,000 hectares. Neither figure includes lands that will be inundated during a river flood event. Nor do these figures take account of the effect of the rise in river levels above the dam.

The construction of the dam threatens the Nowshera valley in the NWFP with inundation during a flood. Also threatened with flooding will be Nowshera City which straddles the Kabul River and has a population of 200,000.

The WAPDA projects that 83,000 people will be displaced by the dam during and after its construction. Other sources, including the government of the NWFP put the figure at over 100,000 people.

Desertification is already a major problem in Sindh. The fertile plains of Sindh have been contracting for decades and the farming population that once inhabited what are now sand dunes have moved to the cities seeking a livelihood. The construction of the Kalabagh dam includes construction of a new canal on the left bank on the river that will take irrigation water to the Rasul-Qadirabad sector of Punjab to open up new agricultural potential. The government of Sindh believe that it will then be presented with a fait accompli of more water diverted away from Sindh. The lessened natural flow of the Indus caused by the dam combined with the existing political restriction of water flow will accelerate Sindh's desertification.

A striking feature of the Indus river delta is its extensive mangrove forest, the sixth largest in the world. The health of the forest is directly dependent on fresh water outflows and the rich silt deposits carried by it. From 1977 to 1990 this mangrove forest diminished in size by 38%. The Sindh forestry department estimates that an outflow of around 33.3 billion cubic metres of water into the Arabian Sea is necessary to sustain the remaining forest. This is roughly 8.6 billion cubic metres more than is currently flowing into the sea. The Karabagh dam will reduce this flow even further.

A 1991 World Conservation Union paper stated that “wildlife species supported by the mangroves are porpoises, jackals, wild bears, reptiles, migratory fowl birds and three species of dolphins. If the mangrove habitat is destroyed, the continued existence in the Indus delta of all these species will be threatened.”

The livelihood of 100,000 people directly dependent on the mangroves will also be in jeopardy. Those indirectly dependent on the mangrove for their livelihoods may run into the millions, including those who fish along the Sindh coast as many of the fish species caught there have breeding grounds among the mangroves. About half the fish exported from Pakistan are netted along the coast of Sindh.

Two other major problems will result from the decreased flow of the Indus River. Salt water intrusion into the Indus is contaminating water supplies and adding to the salinity of agricultural land. Salt water intrusion has occurred up to 100km inland from the sea. People in some areas of Sindh are suffering from various diseases as a result of having only brackish water to drink.
Secondly, the decreased flow has meant an increase in the concentration of industrial (including heavy metals), domestic and agricultural (including pesticides) pollutants in the river.

[Messages of opposition to the Kalabagh dam can be sent to WAPDA via its website at http://www.wapda.gov.pk/htmls/customer-index.html. Please send copies to the anti-dam movement via labourpartypk@yahoo.com]

Educational Talk on Sacking of CJ Chaudhry

Pakistan: The struggle for democracy
Ray Fulcher

[This piece is a write-up of an educational talk given to Melbourne DSP branch on June 30, 2007.]

On June 5 2007 Farooq Tariq, General Secretary of the Labour Party Pakistan (LPP), and hundreds of other democracy activists were arrested across Pakistan

The arrests were part of a crack down by the military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf against a rising democracy movement. The social upsurge was sparked by mass protests by Pakistan’s legal fraternity against the treatment of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry by the military dictatorship.

The protests grew to massive size especially where CJ Chaudhry visited, as hundreds of thousands of ordinary Pakistanis lined the streets to cheer on the Chief Justice who had stood up to Musharraf.

In response to protests, including international protest, the authorities released Farooq Tariq from Kot Lakhpat Jail, Lahore, on Tuesday 19 June. At around the same time all the other political prisoners were also released. This was a victory of the movement.

The protest movement represents the biggest challenge yet to the power of the Musharraf dictatorship. It represents the best opportunity for a return to democracy that Pakistan has seen in almost a decade. The protests represent more than a concern about the treatment of one judge. CJ Chaudhry is merely a focal point around which the Pakistani people’s frustrations and anger at the dictatorship has coalesced.

This article will assess the political background to the movement around CJ Chaudrhy. I will address the political movements under the Musharraf dictatorship and analyse the political and economic role of the military. I will then explain the evolution of the current movement sparked by CJ Chaudhry

Pakistan under Musharraf

Musharraf is not the first military dictator to beset Pakistan. There have been three others since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.

Mohamed Ayub Khan was the first (1958-69), followed by Yahya Khan (1969-71) and the most brutal of them all – Zia ul Haq (1977-88).

To understand the complexity of Pakistani politics there are a few background things to keep in mind:

Religion.

In Pakistan Islamic fundamentalism is strong, especially in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan where the Muttahida Maijlis-I-Amal (MMA) has won state government in the past.

The MMA is a coalition of Islamic fundamentalist groupings. Musharraf has relied on the MMA and MQM at various times to support his regime. The MQM (United National Movement) is a far-right fundamentalist group based originally in the Urdu speaking migrant community in Karachi following partition in 1947. Musharraf is engaged in a balancing act with the fundamentalists. At the same time as he relies on fundamentalists to support his government he must also play his part in the US’ “war on terror” and attack fundamentalism ideologically and some of the groups physically (though this sometimes amounts more to attacking local tribes that he wants suppressed). Musharraf also promotes fundamentalists in regions like Balochistan where he hopes they will break up the tribal loyalties of the opposition forces there. Pakistan is not an “Islamic State” as we think of Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iran. It was not until the dictatorship of Zia ul Haq that sharia law was mixed with civil law. Pakistan was initially envisioned as a “State for Muslims” not a “Muslim State”.

Feudalism

Large parts of Pakistan are still dominated by semi-feudal relationships and also by tribal loyalties, both of which over-ride duty or loyalty to the state or indeed democratic principles. From before the inception of Pakistan the different political parties have had to do deals with feudal landlords and tribal chiefs to get anywhere in the regions they control.

Geography

Pakistan has strategic importance, situated on the Arabian Sea with Iran, Afghanistan, India and China as neighbours. Its position means it straddles some of the most important oil laneways in the region. It is close to the entrance to the Persian Gulf and expected oil pipelines from Central Asia will pass through to its port at Gwadar, itself being developed as a hub for Central Asian development. With the “war on terror” Pakistan became crucial to US operations in the region, bases were made available and operations conducted into Afghanistan by US forces. Its proximity to Iran is also of interest to the US.

National Question

Pakistan could be described as a “forced nation”. There have been nationalist movements operating in Pakistan against the central government since before independence. These have been particularly strong in Sindh and in Balochistan. The mass migration that accompanied the partition of India and Pakistan caused great stresses in places like Karachi where the ethnic makeup was irrevocably altered. To get an idea of the collection of peoples that constitute Pakistan consider just the major language groups: Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Siraiki, Urdu (the official national language), Balochi, Hindko, Brahvi. There are also a range of tribal dialects. A key aspect of the national question is the central role of the dominance of the Punjabi elite in the military, politics, government, industry and agriculture. Major infrastructure projects that are a feature of Musharraf’s regime, such as the Kalabagh Dam and Gwadar port are seen by most provinces as power and land grabs by he Punjabi elite. Kalabagh Dam will primarily benefit Punjabi agriculture and industry whilst turning Sindh into a desert and Gwadar will be of little benefit to the local Baloch as workers are imported and Punjabi companies hold most of the contracts.

The Coup

Musharraf seized power in October 1999 on the pretext of economic mismanagement and corruption in the civilian government and the government’s forcing of the withdrawal of Pakistani “militants” from Kargil in Kashmir, handing victory to India.

Between May-July 1999 Indian forces and some 600 Muslim “insurgents” (well armed, well provisioned, well organised insurgents, some with Pakistan army identity cards) fought around Kargil in Indian Kashmir. Pakistan’s President Nawaz Sharif ordered their withdrawal following some limited Indian successes and intense international pressure, particularly from the US.

Musharraf’s coup was initially very popular – there was corruption not just in this but also in previous governments led by the Muslim League (ML) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Both of these bourgeois parties were hated for their corrupt practices, nepotism and failure to deliver improvements in standards of living for the masses.

And there was economic mismanagement – at least as far as the IMF & World Bank were concerned – they wanted rapid privatisation that the Nawaz Sharif government could not provide due to mass opposition and large protests for improved wages and living conditions.

So on October 12 1999 Musharraf toppled the ML government of Nawaz Sharif promising to “improve the lot of the people within 3 years”.

Since then Musharraf has governed with the support of the MMA, MQM (United National Movement) and Muslim League (Q) (ML(Q)) at various times. The ML (Q) is a split-off from the Muslim League that left in order to support Musharraf.

Economy

Musharraf embarked almost immediately on a massive privatisation drive that has not abated. In fact the attempted privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mills was one of the issues that brought CJ Chaudhry into conflict with Musharraf.

Wholesale privatisation began early and has included (partial or whole privatisation of) Pakistan Telecommunications Limited, the Water and Power Development Authorities, railways, Pakistan International Airlines, Water and Sanitation Authority, national banks, state land, oil and gas fields and infrastructure and more. To get an idea of how this privatisation has been conducted the Pak Saudi Fertiliser Company, valued at Rs 40 billion (Rs = rupees, 30-35 Rs to the Aust $) was sold by the Musharraf regime for Rs 7.5 billion.

While some sectors – the industrial bourgeoisie, feudal landed elite, military – are doing very well out of Musharraf’s economic management the majority – workers and peasants are not.

Along with privatisation came increasing prices that have led to increasing poverty and unemployment.

Between 1999 and 2004 those living below the official poverty line (
Out of a population of around 200 000 000 people 71 million Pakistanis are forced to live in single room houses. 82 million lack basic sanitation. 54 million have no access to clean water. 70% of women giving birth have no access to medical facilities. So much for Musharaf’s claim that he would “improve the lot of the people within 3 years”

But some sectors are doing very nicely economically and the military are one of these.

The Military

The military have always been a political and economic player in Pakistan, under Musharraf this has been strengthened.

The military are now the largest feudal and industrial entity in Pakistan through such institutions as the Fauji Foundation (assets of $169 million) and the Askari Bank (one of a number of banks controlled by current and ex-military officers). The military run the National Logistic Cell, Pakistan’s largest freight transport company with a net worth of around $70million. The Pakistan military owns more agricultural and other land (11.58 million acres) than any other institution or group, making it the largest feudal landlord in the country.

Musharraf has retained power with the support of this military and by gaining US support and money. The “war on terror” has been a big boost to Musharraf’s coffers. The Musharraf regime received US aid worth US$9.1 million during 1999-2001, and was granted $4.2 billion over the next three. In return the US gained access to Pakistani military bases and Musharraf sent 80,000 troops to the Afghan border to fight “terrorism”. Musharraf also plays various groups (fundamentalists, different national groups) and political parties off against each other to keep his opponents divided. Musharraf’s pro-US policies however are extremely unpopular domestically and have strengthened the fundamentalists as the war on terror is viewed as a war on Islam.

Resistance

It has not however been all plain sailing and there are many factors and issues that have plagued the good general before the arrival of CJ Choudry. A few examples:

Between 2000-2002 the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) campaigned for an end to the dictatorship. The ARD was formed by a range of groups including the ML, PPP and the LPP. Various nationalist organisations, trade unions and civil society groups joined it as the realities of the dictatorship became apparent. Musharraf ordered the arrest of the leaders of the ARD in 2001 and they were held for a few days. Farooq Tariq was the ARD’s labour spokesperson. The ARD fell apart following 9/11 as the various groups became confused or sided with either Musharraf’s support to the US or with the Taliban. The LPP was the only party that opposed both the US and fundamentalism.

In 2003 a major peasant struggle erupted. Centred on Okara in the Punjab but involving 30 surrounding villages. Peasants on the military-owned land (the peasant families had worked the land for decades) resisted a push by the military to increase rents and impose onerous conditions on occupancy in an attempt to drive the peasants from the land so it could be sold. The peasants resisted with mass protest and armed struggle against the military and Rangers (an elite border force used extensively for repression) as they imposed a blockade on the villages. The peasant protest was eventually broken by force, but they remained on the land.

Open warfare between the regime and local tribes erupted in Balochistan in 2005 and has tied down over 50,000 Pakistan Army troops in an ongoing conflict. A lesser known insurgency in Southern Waziristan (the southern area of the Nationally Administered Tribal Areas on the border with Afghanistan) is also tying up troops.

Protests around the Kalabagh Dam have spread nationally causing major concerns for Musharraf as the issue unites the provinces and different nationalist groups in opposition. Musharraf has threatened to sack any provincial government that opposes the dam – all provincial governments but the Punjab have come out against the dam.

2. The current movement sparked by CJ Chaudhry

On March 9, Musharraf “suspended” Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry on concocted charges after the CJ had politely declined to resign. The exact charges were not made public but there were allegations of misconduct and misuse of authority.

So what has the CJ done to incur the wrath of Musharraf?

Chaudhry suspended the privatisation of the Pakistan Steel Mills over corruption charges, on the plea of the workers’ union. This jeopardised Musharaf’s whole privatisation project.

The Government-sponsored real estate project, the “New Murre” housing project, was an environmental catastrophe, but despite protests by civil society and environmental groups, the government refused to budge. Chaudhry took a suo motto action and ordered the shelving of the project.

Chaudhry took up issues of human rights and women’s rights cases, as well as offering relief to trade unions in some cases. But don’t get this out of proportion, he was still a bourgeois judge and had made judgments against unions as well.

He took up the case of disappeared activists from Baluchistan province, which has been gripped by civil war since 1999. Hundreds of nationalist activists, including journalists and poets, have disappeared. When the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan moved in the Supreme Court against these disappearances, Chaudhry accepted the plea. Balochistan is cut off from the outside world by the military who don’t want what is happening there to be made public. You can imagine the President’s ire when the CJ of the Supreme Court of Pakistan decides that an investigation is in order.

But perhaps the biggest act of “misconduct” by the CJ was when he publicly stated that Musharraf could not continue both as president and army chief beyond 2007.

Musharraf had plans to get another five-year mandate through the Supreme Court as President/ army chief, as his dictatorial predecessors had done and as he himself did on assuming power.

So Musharraf “suspended” the CJ on March 9.

The movement begins

The response was immediate as the legal fraternity took to the streets to demand the reinstatement of the CJ, withdrawal of charges and non interference by the regime in the judicial system.

In Pakistan lawyers historically have been in the forefront of every democratic struggle in the country. They were the main force behind the movement against the Ayub Khan dictatorship in the sixties and they were also responsible for keeping the democracy movement alive during the Zia dictatorship in the eighties.

In the first 6 days after the suspension of the CJ numerous hunger strike camps, protest camps, small and big demonstrations, mainly by the advocates, took place across Pakistan.

Then on March 16 lawyers took to the streets in mass protests around the country that were met by state violence. Protesters were lathi charged and tear-gassed. Police also attacked Geo TV who was covering the protest. This began a pattern where police or MQM thugs fired on and attacked media outlets that reported lawyer protests. This led to their first major ally joining with the lawyers as the journalists took to the streets demanding freedom of the press.

The movement expands

The movement picked up momentum after that and other forces from the religious right to the far left joined the protests. Opposition political parties like the ML and PPP have joined with the movement. But these are dubious allies. Benazir Bhutto, head of the PPP, admitted last month that the PPP was in contact with the military regime and were ready to share power with General Musharraf as president. This caused a huge furore in the movement as the lawyers were mostly led by PPP activists. The PPP pulled back from that road but the damage had been done.

Trade unions, peasant organisations and civil society organisations have moved into action with the lawyers. Even religious fundamentalist groups like the MMA have given support. These are also unreliable allies. It is not surprising they have come on board as they have long demanded Musharraf cease his dual role whilst at the same time supporting his government. Also the lawyers’ movement is the first time in a decade that secular mobilisations have been bigger than the fundamentalists’rallies .

The movement evolves

As the movement picked up momentum its agenda changed. The demand became not merely the reinstatement of Chaudhry, but the restoration of democracy.

The Bar Councils (lawyers, or advocates’ associations) started inviting Chaudhry to address them. As he travelled the country to do so ordinary Pakistanis in their thousands would line the streets to welcome him.

On May 4 Chaudhry headed towards Lahore from the capital, Islamabad, hundreds of thousands of people lined the GT Road all the way to catch a glimpse of him. An otherwise four-hour journey took 24 hours. Such a spontaneous mass mobilisation has not been seen in Pakistan since 1969, when the Ayub Khan dictatorship was toppled by the people.

The peak of the movement to date came on 14th May 2007. For the first time since General Musharraf took over power in October 1999, the whole of Pakistan shut down. It was the first political strike in seven years.

From Karachi to Peshawar, all the shops were closed and there was very thin traffic on the streets. In Lahore, the largest demonstration since 9th March took place from Lahore High Court to Governor House on the main Mall Road. Over 15,000 participated.

The strike was a solid one and even traders associated with the military regime went on strike.

The strike was a response to the massacre of protestors in Karachi 2 days earlier.

Massacre

On 12 May protestors that went to the reception for CJ Choudhry in Karachi were fired upon by the thugs of the MQM. Some 40 were killed and over 200 injured. Many more were beaten by MQM activists as they tried to escape the shooting. Activists from a range of political parties were among the dead and injured.

The MQM (who run Karachi) had earlier said they would not tolerate a rally in support of the CJ. All the roads linked to Shahrai Faisal, the main road to the airport, were blocked by massive containers and trucks. Local police and Rangers (elite border unit that is used extensively for repression) blocked the CJ at Karachi airport insisting he fly by helicopter to the Sindh Bar Association to avoid the mass receptions. He refused.

While the CJ was held at the airport MQM thugs began firing on the gathered crowds in Karachi and continued their shooting spree for 14 hours. The private TV channel Aaj tried to cover the massacre so the MQM sent some of their people to the station to fire at it for 6 hours.

The outrage at this massacre sparked a deepening of the movement that led to the national strike on May 14. Nor has the movement been cowed anywhere in the country and on June 2 hundreds of thousands again turned up to greet the CJ as he journeyed to Abbottabad. A normally 3-hour trip took him 14 hours.

The massacre also seems to be tearing the MQM apart as many in Punjab and Karachi resign from the organisation in disgust. It has also lost the regime support among the middle classes – the traditional support for the military regime and MQM. The representatives of over 480 markets of Lahore announced and acted upon the call for a shutter down strike on 12th May. It was mainly announced by the former supporters of the Musharaff regime.

The regime has miscalculated

On the night of the Karachi massacre the ML (Q) had planned a “mass” rally in Islamabad in support of the sacking of the CJ. This was a rally planned weeks earlier to counter the growing sympathies for the CJ and a growing demand for an end of the military regime.

All the state employees were asked to attend the rally. All the sanitary workers were forced to attend. The ML(Q) had promised two to five hundred Rupees ($3.5 to $8.5) for every one who attended this “historic” rally, free mineral water and food was also on offer. Despite all these efforts, not more than 20,000 attended the “rally”.

Addressing this rally general Musharraf praised the MQM, saying that “the people of Karachi had come out today”. Yes, they had come out, and were shot down by the MQM.

In the face of the rising movement the support rally was a failure.

Every strategy employed by the Musharraf regime to suppress the movement has so far failed.

In the first few weeks of the campaign the regime tried to put the lid on the movement by unleashing the police to beat up the lawyers as they protested – that failed

Then they tried to exhaust the movement by allowing protests to proceed. Far from exhausting the movement it grew as this opening up brought more people into the movement including activists of political parties mainly from the Muslim league, Peoples Party, parties associated with Awami jamhoori Tehreek, Awami National Party, National Party, Balochistan National Party, MMA, and so on. – another failed strategy

Then came the terrible massacre in Karachi that sparked the biggest national strike in a decade.

The Musharraf regime then turned to the arrests of prominent political activists identified with the movement in an attempt to behead its organisational capacity – the arrest of Farooq et al on June 5 (supposedly for 3 months but released after 15 days) – that has clearly failed

The movement, led initially by the young generation of lawyers, has spread throughout Pakistani society and grown from a protest against suspension of the CJ to a demand for democracy.

It is fuelled by a people’s anger at a regime that promised much but delivered only repression, privatisation, ½ million more unemployed and increasing prices for basic necessities.

Musharraf is in trouble, we don’t know whether this movement will ultimately topple him but it is the biggest challenge to his regime since he took power in 1999.