LPP Explains Decision to Join APDM

Why LPP joined APDM
By Farooq Tariq

Labour Party Pakistan joined the All Parties Democratic Movement on the day when right wing Muslim League Nawaz left the Alliance on 10th December. Three religious parties including Jamiat Ulamai Islam JUI of Fazaul Rehman had already left the APDM to contest the "general elections".

The APDM had decided to boycot the elections under PCO of General Musharad, the only alliance to do so. This was the demand of the fighting organisations of the advocates, teachers, students and also of Awami Jamhuri Tehreek, the Left alliance and generally of civil society as a whole.

Contesting these elections was to legitimise the Musharaf dictatorship and its all repressive measures. The only way to get rid of dicatorship was to launch a mass movement alongside with the present struggle of the militant lawyers community.

The APDM had announced to boycot and a mass movement against the dictatorship.
This alliance is not any more a right wing alliance dominated by the religiousy fundamentalists. It was when formed in July 2007 when all MMA religious parties were part of it and PMNL was the main leadership.

The time is running fast so is the political developments here in Pakistan. The main leadership in APDM has gone over to nationalists. These are not right wing nationalists but those fighting the national exploitations in Baluchistan, Sind and Saraiki areas particularly.

They have successfully fought against the builiding the controversial Kalabagh Dam during the lest few years of Musharaf dictatorship.

Most of the missing persons in Pakistan are not the religious fundamentalists but are from nationalists parties or from Baluchistan.

Majority of the nationalist parties have been in the forefront of democratic struggle since Musharaf had takjen over in 1999. They have not made any unholy alliances during the years and had been opposed to religious fundamentalists.

The APDM on 10th December is not at all the same as of July. The balance of power is fundamentally changed in favour of radical parties. There is no other alterntive political broad base plateform opposition to the regime.

There is only one major religious party in the alliance. That is Jamaat Islami. It is quite organised and have a large infratucture. But the JI has no dominated position and neither they have tried to bring the Islamic agenda on APDM platform.

The issue of boycot or no boycot has resulted an ever increasing split among the religious fundmentalist parties. That is a good news. The MMA is split in practice. We must expose these forces in pratice. The movement against military regime is something that will even further split among these forces. The main parties of the AJT are now also part of APDM. But we are working to strengthen the Left alliance and not abondoning it. The joining of APDM has given a chance to reach those layers more closely who are in forefront in the fight against the military regime.

A Marxist Analysis of Islamic Fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan
by Farooq Sulehria
Links: International Journal for Socialist Renewal: No.18

Pakistan is situated in a region where fundamentalism has been posed, of late, as one of the most threatening questions. The process initiated by the Islamic revolution in Iran has even been internationalised by the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. At the same time, the rise of Hindu radicalism in India has further complicated the situation in Pakistan.

Recently Islamic fundamentalism has risen as an alternative political phenomenon not only in Pakistan but also in the entire Muslim world. Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is partly a link of this international phenomenon and partly caused by specific local reasons.

When analysing Islamic fundamentalism, one must understand that the religion of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are not one and the same thing. Islamic fundamentalism is a reactionary, non-scientific movement aimed at returning society to a centuries-old social set-up, defying all material and historical factors. It is an attempt to roll back the wheel of history.
Fundamentalism finds its roots in the backwardness of society, social deprivation, a low level of consciousness, poverty and ignorance.

Like fascism and national chauvinism, Islamic fundamentalism finds its base in the petty bourgeoisie. But it is not only the petty bourgeoisie that is attracted by fundamentalism; those who have fallen from among the petty bourgeoisie into the ranks of the proletariat and semi-proletariat are also impressed by the movement. Similarly, sections of the proletariat that are newly formed and not yet equipped with class-consciousness and the experience of class struggle are also likely to become supporters of this movement.

They correspond to a section of petty bourgeoisie described by the Communist Manifesto:
The lower middle class, the manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history.

It is possible to distinguish four general causes contributing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

1. The contradictions of imperialism.

Islam has been a political religion since the beginning. When Arabs invaded other countries, the rationale was jihad (holy war) against infidels, although these wars had economic motives. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when Muslim countries, one after the other, were colonised by the imperialist countries, the resistance movements used religion as well as nationalism as a launching pad for independence struggles. In countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the national liberation movement was begun in the name of religion.

Of late, as the multinationals have stepped up their super-exploitation of the Muslim world, one of the natural reactions is hatred of the headquarters (i.e. the West) of these multinationals.
During the Cold War, imperialism used Islamic fundamentalists against the left. The fundamentalist parties were the closest friends of imperialism in the Muslim world. However, in the post-Cold War era, imperialism does not need them as it did in the past. The CIA has stopped funding Islamic fundamentalists. This changed situation brought Islamic reactionaries into contradiction with imperialism. At the same time, because of the experience of centuries of colonisation and exploitation, a hatred for the West, especially for the USA, is widespread in the Muslim world, as in any Third World country.

In the changed situation of the post-Cold War era, fundamentalists turned to anti-imperialist sloganeering and came to the fore as the forces challenging imperialism. Osama bin Laden became a symbol of anti-imperialism no matter what his tactics or the class to which he belongs. The terrorist methods of fundamentalism were seen by the ranks of the fundamentalists as jihad against the USA, while in general the movement was seen as a challenge to the USA.

2. The inability of capitalism to solve the basic problems.

Islamic fundamentalism is spreading especially rapidly in those counties where capitalism has failed to fulfill the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution, where it has failed to eliminate poverty and ignorance and where class contradictions are sharpening. Poverty and ignorance are concomitant. A society ridden with ignorance is fertile soil for the growth of fundamentalist ideas.
3. The failure of the left.

It was in Iran that the Islamic fundamentalists had their first major victory. The Tudeh Party (Iranian Communist Party) believed in the bankrupt Stalinist “two-stage theory” of revolution. Despite having a mass base, the Tudeh Party, in line with its theory, forged an alliance with fundamentalists instead of offering an alternative to the masses. Not only that, but the Iranian left also failed to present itself as an alternative during the democratic movement against the shah and failed or did not attempt to link the democratic movement to the class struggle to overthrow capitalism and replace it with socialism. The alliance with the fundamentalists proved fatal. The fundamentalists on coming to power went on to the physical elimination of the communists, and did it successfully. A golden opportunity for a socialist revolution was lost and the working class had to pay a heavy price, which it is still paying.

Afghanistan was the other country where fundamentalists were able to capture power. In Afghanistan, the fundamentalists came to power as a direct sequel to the socialist government. The Afghan revolutionaries who captured power surrendered to the Stalinist instructions and methods taught by Moscow. Instead of making any genuine effort to consolidate revolution by appealing to internationalism, consolidating workers’ democracy and laying the material basis to prolong the revolution, they resorted to Stalinist, bureaucratic and class-collaborationist methods of running a transitional state. As a result, they failed, paving the way for the fundamentalists.

Similarly in Algeria, where socialists successfully led the national liberation movement against France and remained in power for over two decades, they failed to stop the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The fundamentalist movement in Algeria is one of the strongest movements in the Muslim world today.

4. Providing an alternative society.

The fundamentalists, through their massive network of social services, have built alternative societies in the Muslim countries where they are strong. They provide hospitals, orphanages, schools and many other facilities, which weak capitalist governments have failed to provide to the masses. This adds to their influence as a social force. Their schools (seminaries) are the most influential tool. These seminaries not only provide religious education but also guarantee food and shelter to the children of poor parents who cannot afford education and food.

Imperialism and fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism provides a glaring example of imperialist hypocrisy. Now the USA and the imperialist West pose as the biggest enemy of Islamic fundamentalism and try to fool the working class in the West by presenting fundamentalism as a big challenge to world peace. But it was the same imperialism that used these fundamentalist forces against the left in various Muslim countries.

In the 1950s and 1960s there was a rise of populist, anti-imperialist and class movements. The USA worked out a plan to patronise the fundamentalists in order to weaken these populist movements, which imperialism feared could end up in socialist revolutions. The CIA, under the guidance of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, established a liaison between fundamentalist parties in different countries. According to the plan, a network of Akwanul Muslameen—popularly known as Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), Hamas (Syria), Sarakat ul Islam (Indonesia), Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria) and Jamaat Islami (Pakistan)—was established. These parties were given full economic and political support during that period.

This process reached its peak during the 1980s, when thousands of militants or so-called Mujahideen were trained and sent to Afghanistan. The Jamaat Islami of Pakistan provided the main force, but the above-mentioned parties also sent their share.

The shameful alliance of imperialism and fundamentalism was exposed in Pakistan in 1977 during a movement against Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The fundamentalists started a movement against Bhutto in 1977 based on his rigging of elections. Some left and bourgeois parties also joined hands with the religious parties. Bhutto was a populist nationalist leader and an irritant for imperialism in the region. During this movement, the dollar was devalued in Pakistan. This was the only such instance in Pakistan, indicating the flood of dollars reaching Pakistan during those days.

Similarly, a US official welcomed and waved to a rally of the Jamaat Islami when it passed before the American Center in Lahore while the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of the USA.
In the Afghan war, thousands of guerrillas fought against the Afghan revolution at the command of the CIA and the Pentagon. Osama bin Laden was a hero then. But the post-Cold War situation, as mentioned, brought them into contradiction for at least three reasons. There was a political vacuum because the collapse of the USSR had hurt the trade union and the left movement in the Muslim world, as it had elsewhere. The imperialist political and economic support for the fundamentalist parties stopped. Imperialism now needed another potential enemy in place of the “Communists”.

In the new situation, it was in the interest of both fundamentalism and imperialism to become enemies. The fundamentalists started gaining politically by posing as anti-imperialists, while imperialism now had “Islamic terrorists” to fool its working class and justify big defence budgets.
But is this imperialism-fundamentalism enmity real and long-lasting? No. As soon as a working-class movement begins threatening the class structure and imperialism, the old hypocritical alliance of imperialism and fundamentalism will be renewed. However, before that, because of the strong consciousness among the working classes in the West against fundamentalism, imperialism will not openly support any fundamentalist movement. There may be underhanded deals with fundamentalist governments in Afghanistan or Iran, or with Chechen rebels, but not an open alliance. Similarly, after the experience of the Taliban, imperialism would hardly support any fundamentalist movement coming to power. But it cannot be completely ruled out everywhere; because of the internal contradictions of imperialist countries, a section of imperialism may support particular fundamentalist movements while another section of imperialism opposes them.

It is most likely that, unless a revolutionary situation arises, the present contradiction between fundamentalism and imperialism will suit both of them, and fundamentalists from time to time may make trouble for imperialism.

In Pakistan

Pakistan is witnessing a rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Partly this is linked with international phenomena and the four factors cited above. But there are some local factors as well. Five factors are summarised here.

Pakistan is not a nation-state. It is an unnatural and unhistorical country with its borders drawn in the name of religion. Besides Israel, it is the only country founded in the name of religion. Religion was and still is exploited to provide a basis for the country.

After its creation, the ruling class, in order to keep the country intact and run the state in a multi-national country, has constantly used religion as a tool to deny the rights of small nationalities and to justify unelected regimes. This has combined state and religion. Therefore Pakistan has become a semi-theocratic state, if not a completely theocratic one.

The ruling class has always exploited religion to justify its regimes or to win popularity. The unelected governments used religion to argue that Islam and Western democracy do not match, while so-called elected governments used religion to gain popularity whenever it was threatened. Even a populist leader like Bhutto used the phrase “Islamic socialism” in the late 1960s, and when he was facing a movement in 1977 he decreed Friday a weekly holiday and other such cosmetic Islamic reforms. After decades of exploitation of religion by rulers, there is a developing view that if Islam is the only solution to all problems, then one might as well give the government to those who practice Islam most consistently, i.e. the fundamentalists.

Madaris (religious schools or seminaries) provide a big army of young fundamentalists every year. There are 8000 religious schools, with an estimated 2.5 million to 3.5 million students. These schools are run with money from the Saudi or Kuwaiti governments, various departments of the Pakistani government and local wealthy people, who give big donations from their corruptly obtained money “to please Allah” as well as to “purify” their corrupted money.
Poor parents are compelled by their circumstances to send their children to these schools. Their only options are to send their children to child labour or to these schools, where they will get religious education, food, shelter and a job at some mosque on completing their education. There is an additional factor: it is believed that by learning the Quran by heart at these schools, a boy will secure heaven for himself and his family.

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan really began in the 1980s. On the one hand, the military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq, was using religion to justify his rule and was “Islamising” laws and society. On the other hand, Pakistan had become a base camp for the forces opposing the Afghan revolution. Not only were thousands of Pakistani guerrillas operating from Pakistani soil but also 25,000 guerrillas from other Muslim countries reached Afghanistan through Pakistan.

After the end of the Afghan war, the Pakistan Army started using these guerrilla forces to fight a proxy war in Kashmir. It is still going on. The Pakistan Army is interested in using them only in Kashmir, but the way these guerrillas are brainwashed, it is not possible to restrict them to Kashmir. They are taught to fight against all infidels; hence they reach from the Moro (Philippines) to Chechnya to help their Muslim brethren. When their foreign engagements end and they return home, they may pose a big challenge to the state. Already they are flexing their muscles. The attack on the US embassy in Islamabad in 1999 and the hijacking of an Indian plane from Nepal demanding the release of Maulana Massod, a militant leader, show their strength.

Pakistan’s strategic position also provides a fertile ground for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Two Muslim countries with fundamentalist governments, Iran and Afghanistan, lie on its western border. The governments in both these countries have strong connections with the fundamentalist parties belonging to their respective sects. Pakistan borders India in the east. India is experiencing the rise and rise of Hindu fundamentalists, who have been in power now for about three years. These Hindu reactionaries use sloganeering and war mania against Pakistan to seek popularity. As a reaction to Hindu fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism gains popularity in Pakistan.

Social base

In the 1970 general election, the first election held on an adult franchise in Pakistan, the fundamentalist parties won eighteen seats. In the last election in 1997, they secured only two seats. In the intervening elections, their results were: 1988, seventeen seats; 1990, eighteen seats; 1993, nine seats.

But this does not show their real social strength. In 1970, they had a large parliamentary representation but their social weight was far less. In the last election, they had a far smaller representation in the parliament but they are a far bigger social force. They command a big influence in the army and trade unions and among students. Above all, most of these parties have their own armies of fanatical guerrillas. They can mobilise hundreds of thousands of people.
The last ijtama (party congress) of the Jamaat Islami, the biggest fundamentalist party, was attended by 300,000 people. Similarly, half a million people attended the ijtama in 1999 of Lashkare Tayyaba. The student wings of these various fundamentalist parties, especially Jamaat Islami, control many college and university campuses. At these campuses everything from the appointment of teaching staff to student admissions is done according to their will. No student group opposing them can survive; they are heavily armed and trained in fighting. They simply kill their opponents. Similarly, their influence in public sector trade unions has grown, especially during the 1980s, thanks to the patronage of General Zia ul-Haq.
Divisions among fundamentalist parties

The fundamentalist parties are sharply divided along sectarian lines. Furthermore, these parties can be categorised as serious and non-serious.

Shia and Sunni are the two main sects of Islam. Pakistan is a majority Sunni country with a big Shia minority, almost twenty per cent of the population. Sunni are further divided among various schools of thought. The three main Sunni schools are Brailvi, Deo Bandi and Ahle Hadith. The Brailvi sect is the largest.

Iran is a Shia majority country—almost ninety per cent are Shia. The fundamentalist parties representing Shiites get support from Iran and follow instructions from Tehran. Tehrik e Jaffaria Pakistan and its militant wing Sipah e Muhammad are pro-Iran parties.
Saudi Arabia is Ahle Hadith-dominated, and parties representing Ahle Hadith get support from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Jamiat Ahle Hadith Pakistan and Lashkare Tayyaba are the parties in this category.

Taliban are Deo Bandi and support parties believing in the same school of thought. Jamiat Ulema Islam and the militant Sipah Sahaba Pakistan are pro-Taliban. Deo Bandi and Ahle Hadith are close to each other and hold similar political views.

Fundamentalist parties can be categorised as serious and non-serious. Almost all the parties mentioned above, organized on a sectarian basis, are mostly engaged in sectarian killings or abroad in “jihad”. They are not seriously working on any political agenda with regard to the Pakistani state. They mainly serve the Pakistan Army’s interests in Kashmir or fulfill the sectarian designs drawn up by the foreign Muslim governments to which they adhere ideologically.

The serious fundamentalist forces include parties like Jamaat Islami and Pakistan Awami Tehreek. Although also dominated by certain sects, these parties do not claim to be sectarian or use sectarian sloganeering. Instead they raise political demands and use only the word of Islam. These are the parties, especially Jamaat Islami, which pose a real threat to the state.

Jamaat Islami is the most important. In trade unions and the army and among students, it has the biggest influence. During the Cold War it was a party of the establishment. It is working on a short-term and a long-term agenda of Islamic revolution. As part of its long-term agenda, it is trying to build mass bases. Of late it has been very vocal against feudalism, privatisation and imperialism. To work on its long-term agenda, it tries to avoid any big contradiction with the state that might invite the state’s wrath and hamper its mass growth. As a short-term agenda, it plans to support any coup by a section of the army.

Immediate perspective

Will the fundamentalists capture power in Pakistan? We can safely say no, at least for the near future, because of the balance of forces in the Pakistani state. However, in case of a coup by a fundamentalist section of the army, their rule cannot be excluded even in the near future.
In the long run they may become a mass force capable of forming a government, but this is linked with the growth of the working-class movement and the left. There exists a big gap. Both left and fundamentalists can fill this gap, but at present the fundamentalists are in a far better position.

The sectarian divide is also a big hurdle in their coming to power. Also the havoc played by fundamentalists in Afghanistan and Iran is a factor changing the consciousness of workers in Pakistan. The Afghan and Iran experiences are making the fundamentalists less popular.

Alliances

The Labour Party Pakistan rules out any alliance with the fundamentalists, despite the Jamaat Islami being very vocal recently against privatisation and imperialism. The LPP believes that, just as there can be no alliance with fascists, their can be no alliance with fundamentalists. Although LPP differentiates between them, fascism and fundamentalism have common features because of which the LPP rules out any alliance with fundamentalists.

Both fundamentalists and fascists are anti-working class, anti-women, anti-minorities. The fundamentalists are even worse in some cases. They don’t tolerate even art and literature. They believe in physically eliminating all their opponents. They have the same contempt for workers states and capitalist states. For them, Cuba and the USA are both infidel states and hence enemies.

The LPP’s rejection of alliances with fundamentalists is not based on sentimentalism but on historical lessons. When a revolutionary party forges an alliance, it develops certain illusions among the working class about its ally. Developing any illusions in fundamentalists is suicidal for the left.

After such an alliance, the chance to become an alternative is minimised or may be lost. If the fundamentalists succeed as a result of an alliance, they eliminate the left first of all. Iran is the best example of that. If the fundamentalists come to power, the left has to resist, and it will not be easy to resist if the left has formerly been an ally. On the other hand, if the left has never been an ally, it can benefit whether the fundamentalists succeed or fail. In case of the failure of the fundamentalists, the left may grow as an alternative provided it was presenting itself as one. And if the fundamentalists succeed, the left’s resistance, even if it fails, will be a principled position and may lay the basis for a future.

A History of the Pakistani Left

The left in Pakistan: a brief history
By Farooq Sulehria
Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal: No. 13

[Farooq Sulehria is a member of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party of Pakistan and of the Editorial Board of Links.]

The left movement in Pakistan traces its origins to the Indian communist movement. The Indian communist movement in turn drew its inspiration from Russian revolutions of 1905 and October 1917. Lenin himself paid considerable attention to India, and, long before him, Karl Marx showed a great interest in what he called "an interesting country" and a "good future ally". He wrote quite a few articles on the Indian subcontinent, especially during the 1857 war of independence, which ended in defeat. That defeat strengthened and consolidated the imperialist base for a century, an era of exploitation, plunder and repression.

However, exploitation and plunder, requiring an industrial base and an infrastructure, also gave birth to a vast proletariat. Intensified exploitation also generated resistance by the peasantry.
By the early 20th century, trade unions and strikes had started appearing, while the biggest provinces, Punjab and Bengal, were in total revolt as the peasantry rose up against imperialist Britain's exploitation.

Indian revolutionaries who went into exile had also established contact with their European comrades. Through these contacts the Russian Revolution of 1905 showed a new way forward to Indian revolutionaries. In 1911 these exiled revolutionaries formed the Kairti Kissan Party in the USA. Soon it had established itself in the USA, Canada and Europe.

The Russian Revolution of October 1917 shook India as well. In 1920, the Communist Party of India (CPI) was formed; its leader M.N. Roy participated in the meetings of the Third International. In 1934, the CPI was banned because of its rapidly spreading influence. Its popularity had scared imperialism. The ban did not prevent the spread of communist ideas, however. Communists still worked tirelessly under different umbrella organisations.
In the meantime, the Third International under the leadership of Stalin had gone through a whole period of degeneration. From the "Third Period" to popular fronts and from the non-aggression pact with Hitler to alliance with the allies, the Comintern had taken many somersaults. A total degeneration of the Soviet bureaucratic clique manifested itself in its bankrupt theory of socialism in one country and two-stage theory of revolution.
The CPI blindly followed the Stalinist line, betraying both the Indian proletariat and the revolution. When World War II began, the CPI opposed it until Stalin inked an accord with the allies. The CPI refused to lead the fight against British imperialism because (1) Stalin had become its ally; and (2) according to its two-stage theory, India had yet to undergo the bourgeois democratic revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, teeming millions of youth, revolutionaries and freedom fighters were offering heroic sacrifice to rid their homeland of British imperialism. From 1940 to 1945, 10,000 freedom fighters were martyred; tens of thousands were sent behind bars and tens of thousands flogged. But for the CPI, these freedom fighters were "fifth columnists".

1946 proved the year of revolution. The subcontinent was in total revolt. Mass uprisings, strikes and a mood of revolt marked the beginning of the year. The proletariat was leading the revolt. On February 10, navy sailors went on strike. To show their solidarity with the sailors, the workers of the Royal Air Force went on strike. On March 1, sepoys [Indian soldiers employed by the British] revolted in Jalapur. On March 18, in Dera Doon, Gorka sepoys revolted. Karachi, Bombay, Madras and many other cities were in the grip of a general strike. On April 3, following the Delhi police, the police in the entire province of Bihar revolted. In May, 100,000 employees of Railways and Post struck. On May 23, 400,000 industrial workers joined this strike.
During this wave of strikes, the CPI played the role of strikebreaker. Not drawing any lesson from the defeated revolutions of China (1925-27) and Spain (1934-37), the CPI remained blindly committed to the Stalinist line of two-stage theory in the hope of a bourgeois democratic revolution which never came. This ideological blunder, coupled with a shameful alliance with British imperialism, alienated the CPI from the working class; they were going in opposite directions.

This state of affairs benefited Congress and the Muslim League. Because they led the revolt, a movement that could have ended imperialism as well as capitalism and feudalism proved only a movement of national independence. The millions paid a heavy price for the CPI's blunders. Not only was a chance of class liberation missed, but the Indian subcontinent was also plunged into bloodshed. Huge riots and migrations left behind indelible stains of blood. In 1947, the British left India. The CPI supported the partition and ordered its Muslim cadres to migrate to Pakistan.
Communist Party of Pakistan

The Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) inherited not only cadre from the CPI but also its ideological legacy—i.e., the two-stage theory of revolution. Following their theory, they joined the Muslim League. In the Muslim League, they supported the bourgeoisie against the feudal lords. But the Muslim League was and always had been a party of Muslim feudalists. These feudals soon managed to rid their party of the "infiltrators". These purges drove the CPP to another extreme. Instead of organising the working class for a revolution, it sought a shortcut—a coup.

Here too the CPP depended on a liberal section of the bourgeoisie, in the persons of General Akbar and his mother-in-law, Begum Shahnawaz. They discussed a coup plan with the general. This coup attempt, known as the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, was only a discussion: it was unearthed in 1951, before it was executed. The government banned the CPP, along with its student and trade union wings. At the time of banning, the party had a membership of 200.
Following the ban, CPP members formed the Azad Pakistan Party (Independent Pakistan Party). This party was led by a radical nationalist, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din. In 1957, the Azad Pakistan Party merged with some other so-called liberal progressive groups to form the National Awami Party (NAP-National People's Party). NAP had a reformist program instead of a revolutionary one. Anti-imperialism, secularism, regional autonomy and industrialisation were features of its program.

After the merger, the Communists dissolved their independent identity and did not organise any class movement independently. In 1958, as the capitalist crisis worsened, the workers took to the streets. A working-class movement had begun across Pakistan. It also affected the peasantry. In the same year, NAP leader Maulana Bhashani (who belonged to the then East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh) formed an All Pakistan Peasants Association (Kull Pakistan Kissan Association). A working-class movement began in Lahore that gripped the whole country. To crush this movement, General Ayub imposed martial law on October 26, 1958.
Sino-Soviet conflict

From 1956 onwards, the Sino-Soviet bureaucratic conflict became grave. This conflict was a setback to the international working-class movement, disillusioning a mass of conscious working-class fighters and dividing the working class.

Despite its bureaucratic deformations, the Chinese Revolution of 1949, because of its success in ending feudalism and capitalism, had a great attraction for the colonial world. The Chinese Revolution proved contagious for Pakistan, which has a common border with China. Maoism attracted a big chunk of the working class, youth and intelligentsia, especially students.
One big reason for a tilt towards Maoism was an aversion for Stalinism's impotent theory of two stages, which was stopping the Pakistani left from striking for revolution at a time when revolution was a battle cry. But the Chinese bureaucracy was not a different phenomenon than the Russian. It also had its own priorities and ideological deformations.

Events exposed the real character of the Chinese bureaucracy. It gave support to military dictator General (later self-appointed Field Marshal) Ayub Khan. In 1965, Chou En-lai congratulated Ayub Khan on his success in a sham poll. The so-called election was not even based on adult franchise, but on "basic democracy": a few thousand so-called elected representatives of local bodies had to elect the president. Ne Chu, the head of a visiting Chinese trade delegation, also termed military dictator Ayub Khan a representative of the people.
When a war broke out between India and Pakistan in the same year, it was called a people's war by the Chinese bureaucracy, which gave full support to Ayub Khan's dictatorship and Pakistani chauvinism. When Marshal of the People's Army Chun Lee visited Pakistan after the war, he made a mockery of communist democracy, terming Ayub Khan's system of "basic democracy" akin to the commune system.

Pakistani Maoists started supporting Ayub Khan. They also declared Ayub Khan's foreign policy progressive, utterly forgetting the Marxist point of view that foreign policy is merely a continuation of internal policy. The ruling classes adopt certain foreign policies, and for that matter internal policies, in order to safeguard and prolong their rule.
Later, Marshal Lee also called India an "aggressor", not bothering to elaborate whether this referred to the Indian ruling class or the Indian working class.

In 1967, a Chinese trade delegation visited Pakistan. The statement by the head of the delegation said: "Led by General Ayub Khan, Pakistan has made a great development in the fields of agriculture as well as industry. The day is not far when Pakistan will achieve total economic independence." (Pakistan Times, 29-10-1996). The policies of class collaboration that the Chinese bureaucracy had adopted were nakedly manifested in Pakistan during this period.
The Soviet bureaucracy was not playing a radical role either. It was supporting the Indian bourgeois. The line for the pro-Moscow left during this period can be gauged from an extract from a monthly party organ, Outlook. In April 1964 it wrote: "Our newly emerging bourgeois will come in conflict with the international bourgeois. Driven by economic compulsions, Habib Ullahs, Sehgals and Walikas will have to turn to socialist bloc for trade. This process will end western monopoly on our economics. This is where we are heading for. And I will be the biggest mad if I oppose General Ayub for this door opening towards left."
To another question, the same issue suggested that, were the masses conscious, the "basic democracies" could become training institutions for soviets.

The pro-Moscow left dissolved into so-called liberal, progressive bourgeois parties. The left itself remained divided into pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing. The former would support one section of the bourgeoisie, terming it progressive, while the latter would support the other section of the bourgeoisie, terming that progressive.

The left during this period failed to see the unprecedented economic growth internationally. The post-World War II boom also affected Pakistan. A process of significant industrialisation had begun for the first time, giving birth to capitalism's gravedigger, the proletariat, in a big way. The left during this period, instead of organising and associating itself with the new layer of the proletariat, was hunting for progressives among the bourgeoisie to whom it could lend support. Its flirtation with the working class was confined only to sloganeering. This was why, when a revolutionary movement, the first of its kind, began in 1968-69 and explosive revolutionary events swept away the military dictatorship which had made dictator Ayub the richest president of the poorest country, the left was taken aback.

Revolutionary movement of 1968-69

During this movement, which went on for few months, two parallel powers were in operation. On one hand, workers and peasants controlled the country. On the other hand, due to the absence of proletarian leadership, the bourgeoisie was in control of the state apparatus.

The movement had begun as a protest against a hike in the price of sugar. The students joined this protest. A student of Rawalpindi Polytechnic College, Abdul Hameed, was shot dead in a protest demonstration.

This spark ignited the whole society. Now the proletariat joined the movement. The workers were taking over the mills and factories, the peasantry had risen up, and strike committees appeared, controlling the cities. In the industrial district of Faisalabad, the district administration had to seek the permission of local labour leader Mukhtar Rana for the supply of goods through trucks. All censorship had failed. Trains were carrying the revolutionary message across the country. Workers invented new methods of communication.

It was a new phenomenon. But it had not come from the heavens. Industrialisation, and exploitation and oppression widening the gulf between rich and poor, brought about this change. In the 1960s, the ruling classes had intensified their plunder. For example, in 1965, according to the Delhi-based weekly Links, dictator Ayub's family assets were estimated at Rs250 million, not including the wealth transferred abroad into foreign banks. Similarly, 66 per cent of industrial capital, 80 per cent of banking, and 97 per cent of insurance business was owned by 22 families. In contrast, the average monthly income of a working-class family was Rs780 (US$16 at that time).

In 1967, railway workers were the first to take action, going on strike. The official union had opposed the industrial action. The unofficial union, controlled by Communists, also opposed it because they were supporting "anti-imperialist" Ayub Khan. Nevertheless, the railway workers formed workers' committees and began their own action.

The government resorted to all kinds of repression, but it had to grant some of the demands before the strike was called off. The working class, peasantry and students all were in total revolt. But the left, still caught up in its two-stage theory, was dreaming of bourgeois democratic revolution led by progressive bourgeois.

Professor Muzafar Ahmad, a Communist leader of the National Awami Party, explained this position at the time in Outlook. He said that when he talked of favourable objective conditions, he did not mean objective conditions for socialism but for bourgeois democracy. Consciousness in Pakistan was in no way socialist; therefore revolution must pass through stages, he added. We definitely need a revolutionary party, but in the next stage, he concluded.

Formation of Pakistan People's Party

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was formed on September 1, 1967. Its program was radical socialist; a Communist leader, J.A. Rahim, had written its basic manifesto. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the father of Benazir Bhutto) appeared in the political arena as a challenge to the Ayub dictatorship. The Communists (both pro-Moscow Stalinists and Maoists) were supporting the Ayub dictatorship, while Bhutto was representing the masses' feeling.

Bhutto, himself a feudal lord from Sindh, had been foreign minister in Ayub's cabinet. An intelligent bourgeois politician, he raised the slogan of socialism and joined hands with some leftists to form the PPP. When the Ayub dictatorship started targeting Bhutto, he became a symbol of resistance, strengthening his popularity and his grip on the party.

In fact, the PPP's popularity was a sequel to the 1968-69 revolutionary movement. Even prior to 1970's first ever general election on an adult franchise basis, the masses had joined this party because of its socialist program. The labour leaders who became strong because of the 1968 movement joined this party.

It was no accident that the PPP became a mass party. In the colonial world, only parties with a socialist program become popular. This reflects the need for a socialist change. But the Pakistani left as usual failed to understand the unfolding events. They found a radical bourgeois in Bhutto and started supporting him. Instead of organising and launching class struggle, the left developed the working class's illusions in Bhutto and the PPP. They reconciled with feudals and capitalists in the PPP, and even presented them as leaders. Hence the PPP became a working-class party with feudal leaders who used socialist sloganeering.

Instead of organising the PPP on a radical socialist program, it was organised on a bourgeois democratic basis, which led to a right-wing turn by the party. It was again their ideology that stopped the left organising the PPP on a revolutionary basis. The left was just working in line with the foreign policy of Moscow and Beijing.

When the PPP came to power in 1972, many Communists joined the government, but the PPP could not bring any fundamental change despite some radical reforms. This disillusioned the working class. The proletariat took to the streets during the period May-September 1972. The movement was especially strong in Karachi. The government decided to crush the movement. A demonstration of workers was fired on in Gandhi, Karachi, leaving dozens dead. This angered the Communists who had joined the government, and some of them resigned in protest. Perhaps they had forgotten that capitalist governments, no matter how radical they may be at times, always repress the proletariat.

Disillusioned by Bhutto and the PPP, the left went looking for more progressive bourgeois figures, leaving the working class, having illusions in the PPP, at the mercy of its feudal and capitalist leaders.

The left failed to offer any alternative during this period. Hence when the disillusionment grew, it was right-wing religious fanatics and reactionary forces that became an alternative to the PPP. In 1977, a movement began against the government, spurred by economic conditions and US intervention. The left did not understand the nature of the movement nor analyse the nature of its leadership. The left termed it a movement of democratic liberties and urged the working class to join it.

In a statement from Hyderabad jail on April 12, 1977, Miraj Mohammad Khan, a leader of the pro-Beijing Qaumi Mahaz e Azadi party, and Sher Mohammad Marri and Ata Ullah Mengal, two pro-Moscow Baluch nationalist leaders, said: "We appeal to the workers, peasants, students, intellectuals and toiling masses to join the ongoing people's movement which is a movement of democratic liberties. We believe this movement will rid our motherland of the dictatorship." They hoped to rid the "motherland" of "dictatorship" through religious fundamentalists. Terming the Bhutto regime a dictatorship was not correct either socially or politically.

The hope of democracy from religious fanatics backed by the USA was irrational. Their illogical analysis and hopes were soon dashed when another military dictatorship rid the "motherland" of Bhutto's "dictatorship". It was the left that suffered most during this military regime, led by General Zia Ul Haq.

Left in the 1980s

The 1980s were years of resistance against the dictatorship. The proletariat offered heroic resistance and an unprecedented fight back. For the left it was a decade of mergers and alliances.
Bhutto was hanged in 1979, showing that the bourgeoisie doesn't tolerate even some reforms, and imperialism can go to any length to crush the working-class movement.

Bhutto's hanging once aging popularised the PPP, and it became a symbol of resistance against dictatorship. A united front, Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), was formed. The PPP right wing, liberals and the left all joined hands on this platform. A united front against dictatorship is not a wrong policy, but the left, instead of presenting a transitional program and linking it with a socialist program, reduced itself to social democratic demands.

By this time the Communist Party (pro-Moscow Stalinist), Workers Peasants Party (MKP, a Maoist party) and Socialist Party (a Stalinist party) had some good mass bases in different areas. But they did not use these bases to launch an independent and organised struggle.

The national question during this period became even sharper because of ruthless oppression by the regime in Sindh, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. But the left failed to take a Leninist stand on the national question because that was not Moscow's line.

In 1986, Pakistan National Party, a faction of MKP, National Democratic Party and Awami Tehrik (People's Movement), all four pro-Moscow groups, merged to form Awami National Party (People's National Party). It was another attempt at a class-collaborationist alliance with illusions in the bourgeoisie; bourgeois nationalists were the main leaders of the new party.
Soon the Pakistan National Party dissociated itself from the merger, followed by Awami Tehrik and the section of MKP. In1987, QIP (National Revolutionary Party—Qaumi Inqlabi Party) was formed again as a result of mergers among different left and bourgeois nationalist parties, but after one year it was disbanded. In 1988, Qaumi Mahaz-e-Azadi (National Liberation Front), a Maoist party, and the Workers Party (a Stalinist party) merged to form AJP (Awami Jomhori Party—People's Democratic Party), but barely a few months had passed when, on the eve of an election, the merger was split. The National Liberation Front, led by Meraj Mohammad Khan, left the party. The issue was whether AJP should support Benazir or Nawaz Sharif.
However, in 1986 a new element had entered the politics of the Pakistani left. This was the Struggle Group, activists who called themselves supporters of the monthly Mazdoor Jeddojuhd (Workers Struggle). The Struggle Group, formed in 1980 in the Netherlands, was working within the PPP because this was a period of fight back for democracy and the working class had many illusions in the PPP.

In 1986, the group's main leadership returned from exile because there were limited liberties available now under the military dictatorship.

Post-Soviet left

The collapse of the Soviet Union shattered the Pakistani left. It almost disappeared. On the other hand, the military regime ended following the plane crash that killed military dictator General Zia, and elections were held in 1988. Benazir Bhutto came to power, but she badly disillusioned the working class.

Disillusionment with the PPP and the break-up of the USSR generated hopelessness and desperation. The Stalinist left in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the world, turned to social democracy. The early 1990s were a period of counter-revolutionary consciousness in Pakistan, giving birth to the rise of fundamentalism.

The Struggle Group, however, did not lose faith in socialism. It ended the entrist policy in view of its analysis that the working class would leave the PPP from now on and that an alternative should be built. To build this alternative party, it launched a Jeddojuhd Inqlabi Tehrik (Struggle Revolutionary Movement) in 1993 for the formation of a workers' party by the trade union movement. In 1997, after some success, it formed the Labour Party Pakistan. The Stalinist parties by now had shrunk to small groups.

For the sake of survival, the Communist Party and MKP merged in 1994 to form CMKP (Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party). On June 3, 1999, another three parties—AJP, Pakistan National Party and Socialist Party—merged to form the National Workers Party (NWP). Both CMKP and NWP still believe in a bourgeois democratic program, while NWP is turning more and more to the right. Both are ageing parties with hardly any chance of growth.

At present the LPP, CMKP and NWP are the three main parties. Besides these three, there are some left groups having little influence. None of the left parties has a mass base. The left as a whole is hardly recognised as a force at present. However, the LPP has achieved some success since its formation in gaining a semi-mass base, especially in Sindh. There exists a big gap on the left. The LPP is filling the gap. At present it has a membership of more than 1500, but it is not yet a very consolidated membership.

Future downsizing, privatisation, poverty and ever increasing joblessness will make workers take to the streets, and the left will get a chance to organise these radicalised masses. But at the same time, fundamentalists may appear as a big danger since they are at present more organised and strong.

Time for Musharraf to Go

Pakistan: Can Musharraf survive?

Farooq Tariq, Lahore
25 January 2008

It seems that the reign of General Pervez Musharraf is on its last legs. Musharraf has become the most detested president in the history of Pakistan. No longer are there progressives, liberals or moderates in his camp.

Musharraf is unloved even by most religious extremists. His policies have given them space into which they have moved aggressively. But Washington demanded that he suppress them to prove his usefulness to US imperialism and he did. However, he failed to please either Washington or the extremists.

The economic crisis has isolated him from the vast majority of ordinary Pakistanis, including formerly close associates. His traditional supporters among the Chamber of Commerce has evaporated. Musharraf’s comments about democracy during his nine-day European tour that began on January 20 has annoyed democrats inside and outside Pakistan. The comment that the “West is obsessed about democracy” was a direct insult to the people of Pakistan, but neither did his sarcastic taunting please his European friends. Gone are the days when he could talk nonsense and get away with it!

No Plan B

The brutal assassination of former prime minister and leader of the opposition Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Benazir Bhutto, was a shock to many European governments friendly to Musharraf. The unprecedented reaction to Benazir’s murder is shattering his image at home and abroad. The US and British governments’ Plan A for maintaining stability in Pakistan was built on an unholy governing combination of Benazir and Musharraf. This has come undone and there seems to be no Plan B.

Has Musharraf outlived his usefulness to his imperialist masters? Musharraf’s repeated assurances that nuclear weapons are in safe hands and the army cannot be defeated by religious fundamentalists illustrates the concerns of European countries. His trip is to address these worries. However, his justification for imposing a state of emergency, deposing and arresting the country’s top judges, arresting thousands and curbing the media will satisfy none.

In the face of the proposed 18 February general elections there are two political camps: those participating and those boycotting. The massive turnout at the boycott meeting by All Parties Democratic Movement on 22 January in Loralai, Baluchistan indicates that the boycott campaign is picking up steam. This was the fourth successive APDM mass rally in Baluchistan.

The Pakistan Muslim league-Q (PML-Q), Musharraf’s favorite, is in absolute crisis after the recent shortages of food items, electricity and gas. The PML-Q candidates are the target of anti-Musharraf anger. The general perception is that if you are against Musharraf, do not vote for the PML-Q. Unless there is an all-out rigging of the election, there is no guarantee that Musharraf’s supported candidates will win.

If PPP and Pakistan Muslim league-Nawaz (PML-N) candidates gain a majority in the next parliament, Musharraf will find it very difficult to repeat what he did following the 2002 election, when he bribed many PML-N and PPP parliamentarians to join hands with the PML-Q to form a majority government.

‘Go Musharraf go!’

At the time, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Musharraf’s military regime was supported by both US and European governments. But in 2008 he is isolated. It will be difficult for any parliamentarian elected on anti-Musharaf feeling to cross over to his camp.

Boycott or no boycott, the future scenario seems more and more problematic for Musharraf. His departure seems written on the front door of every home. Only another 9/11-like situation could alter his fate. Students are awakening and so is the trade union movement. That, combined with the pressure from the lawyers movement and growing participation by civil society, may succeed in pushing Musharraf from power.

Pakistan may take a page from their Nepalese brothers and sisters who recently brought down the monarchy. “If they can get rid of the King, why can not we do it here with the military dictatorship?” is the question many activists ask. Let’s do it the Nepalese way: with a peaceful massive movement everyone can get out into the street to insist: “Go Musharaf go!”

[Farooq Tariq is the national spokesperson for the Labour Party of Pakistan (LPP), which is part of the APDM. The LPP is playing a significant role in the mass movement to bring down the Musharraf regime and is calling for financial assistance to assist its work from democracy supporters world-wide. You can deposit money in the account: People’s Power Fighting Fund, Commonwealth Bank, 062026 1006 0743.]

Balochistan National Liberation Struggle

Balochistan: Pakistan's internal war

Ray Fulcher
23 November 2006
Green Left Weekly

Open warfare erupted between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani military in December 2005 following decades of what the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) described as a “simmering insurgency”. An HRCP investigation conducted in December 2005 and January 2006 detailed ongoing summary executions, disappearances, torture and indiscriminate bombing and artillery attacks against the people of Pakistan’s south-western province of Balochistan. Baloch nationalist fighters, mainly from the Bugti and Marri tribes, continue to attack Pakistani military and paramilitary forces and sabotage gas pipelines and other infrastructure on a daily basis.

General Pervez Musharraf’s government asserts that the insurgency is an attempt by some tribal chieftains (sardars) to prevent economic development in Balochistan and maintain their traditional power. Baloch nationalists, however, point to the ongoing expropriation of Balochistan’s natural resources, exclusion from development projects, political marginalisation, transmigration and continuing militarisation as reasons for the insurgency.

On April 30 the Musharraf regime banned Baloch nationalist leaders from travelling outside Pakistan. On May 1 the Balochistan Liberation Army claimed responsibility for blowing up a railway bridge in the Kohlu district of Balochistan, cutting the line between the provincial capital, Quetta, and Iran. In the same month the Musharaff government banned the BLA as a terrorist organisation. On August 26 the Pakistani military killed Nawab Akbar Bugti, sardar of the Bugti tribe (one of Balochistan’s largest tribes) and a leader of the Baloch national liberation movement. Hundreds of people were arrested after rioting erupted throughout Balochistan in response to the killing.

Catalyst for war

Two incidents are widely recognised as being the catalyst for the current state of open warfare in Balochistan. The rape of a female doctor at Sui hospital by a Pakistani army officer and several soldiers of the Defence Security Guards (DSG — charged with guarding Sui’s gas installations) on January 2, 2005, sparked an increase in insurgent attacks. The handling of the rape allegations by the Pakistan government only inflamed the initial sense of outrage. Dr Shazia Khalid worked for Pakistan Petroleum Limited, which operates the Sui gas fields.

Both PPL and the government tried to cover up the rape. The officer accused of the rape was given time on the government-run Pakistan Television to argue his version of events and Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, publicly affirmed the officer’s innocence. Khalid was later forced into quasi-exile by the Pakistani regime.

In response to the rape, between January 7-11, militants of the Bugti tribe attacked the Sui gas fields, which produce much of Pakistan’s natural gas, causing disruption to supplies for over a month. The government responded with house-to-house searches by 7000 regular troops plus Frontier Corps personnel (FC — a despised paramilitary unit), supported by armour, artillery and gunships. The houses of those “suspected” of launching the attack were bulldozed. More than 1500 insurgent attacks were mounted between January 7 and April 3, 2005, throughout the province, culminating in a pitched battle between the FC and Bugti tribespeople.

The second incident was a December 14, 2005, insurgent rocket attack on an FC camp on the outskirts of Kohlu in the Marri tribal area that Musharraf was visiting. The following day insurgents fired on a helicopter carrying the FC’s inspector-general, Major-General Shujaat Zamir Dar, who was injured in the attack. Hours, later Pakistani forces launched major attacks on farari camps (rebel bases) in the province.

According to the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, Pakistani military forces in the region increased after December 14 to 50,000 regular army troops and 30,000 FC. By February 2006, some 300 civilians had been killed, including more than 120 children, and 4000 Baloch had been arrested. Accurate information on Pakistani army deployments are difficult to come by as the military continue to deny that large-scale operations are even happening and the region is closed to outside journalists.

These events were, however, only manifestations of the historical treatment of Balochistan by the national government and the response of Baloch nationalists. Baloch nationalism and the grievances of Balochistan stem from a history of exploitation and marginalisation of the Baloch by the central, Punjabi-dominated, federal government.

Key issues for the Baloch national liberation movement include: resource distribution, including jobs for Baloch, and the associated issue of transmigration; the expansion of Pakistani military cantonments and militarisation of the province; and whether independence or autonomy is the aim of the insurgency.

The government’s treatment of the Baloch can partly be explained by Balochistan’s strategic and economic importance to the Pakistani state. Balochistan’s place in the Islamic Republic Bordering the Arabian Sea, greater Balochistan is divided among three countries — Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Balochistan province, located in the south-west, has 43% of Pakistan’s territory but only 5% of its population (around 6,500,000 people). It also contains a substantial amount of Pakistan’s energy and mineral resources and produces over 40% of the country’s primary energy, including almost half of its total gas production. Large deposits of coal, copper, silver, platinum, aluminium, gold and uranium are situated within its borders.

Balochistan is ethnically divided between the Baloch (45%) and the Pashtun (38%), with a further 17% of the population being mixed or other ethnicity. The Pashtun are concentrated in a belt in the north-west of the province roughly stretching between Qila Abdullah near the Afghan border, Quetta and Loralai to the east. The Ras Koh ranges, near the border with Iran and Afghanistan, is where Pakistan conducts its nuclear tests. A proposed gas pipeline linking Iran, Turkmenistan and India will pass through the province.

Balochistan comprises almost all of Pakistan’s coastline — 756 kilometers on the Arabian Sea. It provides Pakistan with an exclusive economic zone of 180,000 square kilometres potentially rich in mineral resources. It is also home to two of Pakistan’s three naval bases, one of which, Gwadar, is being developed as an alternative to the base at Karachi in Sindh, which is viewed as vulnerable to the Indian navy. US military operations in southern Afghanistan are launched from bases in Balochistan and both the Taliban and al Qaeda purportedly operate out of the more remote areas of the province.

Despite being the repository of so much of Pakistan’s natural resources and the site of major development projects, Balochistan has benefited little from the exploitation of its wealth. Plundering Balochistan A central demand of Baloch nationalists is the equitable sharing of revenue from the province’s natural resources. A case in point is Balochistan’s production of natural gas, which is crucial to Pakistan’s economy. Despite accounting for 36-45% of Pakistan’s gas production, the province consumes only 17% of what it produces. The remainder is sold at a much lower price to the rest of the country than gas produced in Punjab and Sindh. That the federal government returns only 12.4% of the gas royalties actually due to the provincial government compounds this inequality.

Gas was discovered in Sui in 1953 and supplied to cities in the Punjab by 1964. The Baloch capital of Quetta only received a gas supply in 1986, and then only because the federal government had decided to station a military garrison there. In total only four of Balochistan’s 26 districts have been supplied with gas. Insurgent attacks on gas pipelines are common and have caused the shutting down of industrial production in the Punjab for lengthy periods.

Development and transmigration Balochistan is the site of a number of major development projects. A key grievance of Baloch nationalists is the marginalisation of their people from the benefits of these projects. Gwadar port, on the Arabian Sea near the border with Iran and close to the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, is being developed with Chinese assistance and epitomises the national government’s approach to “development” in the province. Development of Gwadar will provide a port, warehousing and industry to more than 20 countries. Completion is expected in 2010, when the port will be able to receive oil tankers of over 200,000 tonnes. Along with an associated industrial development and free-trade zone, Gwadar will be linked to Central Asia by a road and rail network currently under construction. China has also discussed with Pakistan on the building of a 60,000-barrels-per-day oil refinery at Gwadar. Almost all the construction contracts were awarded to non-Baloch, mainly Punjabi, firms. Despite thousands of jobless Baloch engineers and technicians being available, only low-grade jobs are offered to Baloch workers. The rest of the positions are filled largely by Punjabi and other non-Baloch workers. Of the 600 personnel that worked on the first stage of construction, only 100 were Baloch, and they were mainly day-labourers. No effort has been made by the central government to train the local population so they can obtain jobs at Gwadar.

Once the Musharraf government’s plans for the port are complete, the population of Gwadar and surrounding districts will rise from 70,000 to 2 million, overwhelmingly transforming the ethnic makeup of the region as Punjabi, Sindhi and other workers are moved into the area. This is not an uncommon situation for areas under development in Balochistan, or in civil administration or the military where Baloch are significantly under-represented. Less than 1% of the 30,000 FC personnel in Balochistan are Baloch and only 3% of the coastguard is ethnic Baloch. Nawab Akbar Bugti articulated the fears of the Baloch people in January 2005 when he accused the Musharraf government of “trying to change the Baloch majority into a minority by accommodating more than five million non-locals in Gwadar and other developed areas”.

Militarisation and Islamisation

In order to force this situation onto the Baloch, the federal government has increasingly militarised their province. The large influx of troops from December 2005, when the most recent hostilities erupted, only accelerated this process. There are military/police roadblocks throughout the province and the Pakistani intelligence service is reportedly creating militias among local opponents of nationalist leaders. The military currently has two cantonments (large military bases) in the province at Quetta and Sibbi. Of central concern to the nationalists is the stated aim of the federal government to create three more cantonments at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu. This measure is viewed by the Baloch as a further attempt to deprive them of the natural resources in those areas and enhance the military’s ability to suppress their struggle.

Hand-in-hand with this use of force is an ideological push by the Musharraf regime to break the loyalty of the Baloch to their tribal leaders. The Baloch nationalists are strongly opposed to the influence of the mullahs and also oppose the Taliban (who currently operate out of Balochistan). The Musharraf regime has attempted to promote Islamic fundamentalism in the province to break the hold of the sardars. In rigged 2002 provincial elections, the army and government ensured the victory of the fundamentalist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Coalition for Action) in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

Although it no longer holds power there, the MMA is heavily supported in Balochistan by the Musharraf regime. Through the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA), the federal government continues to establish madrassas (religious schools) to bolster the mullahs’ influence. The lack of secular education is more noticeable in Balochistan than in any other province, with 50% of children compelled to attend the religious schools. This is not surprising given that the national budget for the MRA is around 1.2 billion rupees whilst the secular education ministry is allocated 200 million. It is leading to what Baloch nationalists call the “Talibanisation” of Balochistan.

Supporting the influence of the mullahs and fundamentalist organisations against the Baloch nationalists has another benefit for Musharraf. It allows him to posture on the world stage and try to convince foreign governments of the risk of the spread of fundamentalism in the region. He has also launched an international disinformation campaign equating the Baloch national struggle with Islamic terrorism and linking nationalist militants with al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The end result of the expropriation of Balochistan’s natural resources and the marginalisation of Baloch from development projects is the province’s low standard of living. It is the poorest province in Pakistan.

According to the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) in Karachi, Balochistan has the highest levels of poverty in Pakistan, nearly double that of the Punjab. Over half the population subsists below the official poverty line, less than 50% have clean drinking water, only 50% of children attend primary school and only 33% of children up to two years old have any form of immunisation. Women’s literacy is the lowest in Pakistan, standing at just 7%. The federal government’s 2003-04 Labour Force Survey shows urban unemployment of 12.5% in Balochistan compared to 9.7% for Pakistan as a whole. Electricity is supplied to barely 20% of the population.

The Musharraf regime has long blamed the nationalist leaders for Balochistan’s underdevelopment, arguing that they are “anti-development”. However, research conducted by the SPDC in 2001 shows those areas under control of nationalist leaders, such as the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, Nawab Khair Mari and Sardar Attaullah Mengal, were often better developed. A number of indicators, such as road networks, primary school enrolments, access to clean water and irrigation are often ranked higher than areas aligned to the federal government.

Balochistan’s history of struggle

The Baloch have a long history of struggle against impositions by the Pakistani state. Their history, however, pre-dates the formation of Pakistan. The Baloch lay claim to a history reaching back 2000 years. In the 12th century, Mir Jalal Khan united 44 Baloch tribes; in the 15th century the Confederation of Rind Laskhari was established and the Khanate of Balochistan in the 17th. During the British Raj, Britain annexed a strip of land adjoining Afghanistan (“British Balochistan”) but beyond that did not interfere in the affairs of Balochistan so long as the Baloch allowed the British Army access to Afghanistan.

The Baloch campaigned for independence during the final decades of the British Raj but were compelled to join Pakistan in 1947. The government in Islamabad sought to subsume Baloch identity into a larger Pakistani identity. Part of its strategy was an attempt to destroy the power of the tribal chiefs and concentrate all authority in the central government. This strategy continues to this day. Even the first two constitutions of Pakistan did not recognise the Baloch as a distinct group.

Since independence, Islamabad has come into open conflict with the Baloch on four occasions — 1948, 1958, 1962, and, most bloodily, from 1973 to 1977, when a growing guerrilla movement led to an armed insurrection that ravaged the province. Within 24 hours of the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Khan of Kalat (the largest “princely state” in Balochistan) declared independence. On April 1, 1948, the Pakistani army invaded and the Khan capitulated. His brother, Karim, continued to resist with around 700 guerrillas but was soon crushed.

Islamabad merged the four provinces of West Pakistan into “One Unit” in 1954. This was a bid to counter the strength of East Pakistan (which later became Bangladesh) and the possibility of the minority provinces (Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh) uniting with the east against the Punjab. A large anti-One Unit movement emerged in Balochistan. To crush this movement the Pakistan army again invaded. The Khan of Kalat was arrested and large-scale arrests were carried out. Nauroz Khan led a resistance of 1000 militia that fought the army in pitched battles for over a year. In May 1959 Nauroz Khan was arrested at a parley with the army and died in prison in 1964, becoming a symbol of Baloch resistance. Five of his relatives, including his son, were hanged.

Following a 1973 visit of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Iran, where the Shah warned him against allowing nationalist movements on Iran’s border, the elected government of Balochistan was dismissed. The provincial government, led by Sardar Ataulah Mengal, had been seeking greater control in areas of development and industrialisation. The pretext used for dismissal was that a cache of 350 Soviet submachine guns and 100,000 rounds of ammunition had supposedly been discovered in the Iraqi attache’s house and were destined for Balochistan. The Pakistani army invaded Balochistan with 78,000 troops supported by Iranian Cobra helicopters and were resisted by some 50,000 tribespeople. The conflict took the lives of 3300 Pakistani troops, 5300 tribespeople and thousands of civilians.

In 1977 the military staged a coup and overthrew Bhutto, declared “victory” in Balochistan and withdrew. There are distinct similarities between the period immediately prior to the 1973 insurrection and the current situation.

After the 1962 conflict Baloch nationalists began planning a movement capable of defending their national interests. Under the leadership of Sher Mohammed Marri what would later become the basic structure of the 1973 insurrection was created. In July 1963, 22 rebel camps were set up covering large areas of Balochistan, ranging from lands in the south belonging to the Mengal tribes to those of the Marris in the north. This structure later became the Baloch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) and initiated the 1973 insurrection.

The current insurgency

The groupings that underpin the current Baloch national movement emerged gradually after the 1973-77 conflict. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is a clandestine militant group that was formed in the early 1980s. It is believed to be headed by Khair Bux Marri of the Marri tribe. It has taken responsibility for most of the attacks against the Pakistan military. The BLA calls for the creation of a Greater Balochistan, including the Baloch territories in Iran and Afghanistan.

The Baloch National Party (BNP) is an amalgam of moderate forces that concentrate on winning political support for nationalism amongst the Baloch. It calls for extensive provincial autonomy, limiting the central government to control of defense, foreign affairs, currency, and communications.

The Balochistan Students Organisation (BSO) campaigns for a multinational Pakistan and for the revival of Baloch nationalism. It generally represents the aspirations of the educated but underemployed Baloch middle class. It calls for the continuation of quotas and for the recognition of the Baloch language as a medium of instruction in the province.

The Bugti tribe, formerly led by Nawab Akbar Bugti, fields a force of some 10,000 tribal fighters. The Dera Bugti district has been the site of intense operations by the Pakistan military in 2005-06. As well as the Bugti tribe, the Mengal (the second largest tribe in Balochistan) and the Marri are in open revolt against the government. The conflict is not, however, limited to these tribal areas but spread throughout the province.

There is conflict between the tribes but they are united against the Pakistani army. Between December 2005, when the Pakistan military launched its most recent assault on Balochistan, and June 2006, more than 900 Baloch have been killed, 140,000 displaced, 450 political activists (mainly from the BNP) disappeared and 4000 activists arrested. In late 2005-early 2006 the Pakistan military laid siege to Dera Bugti, attacking with artillery and air strikes. Many civilians were killed and 85% of the 25,000-strong population fled. The town of Kohlu also came under siege from Pakistan forces around the same time, virtually imprisoning the 12,000 inhabitants for weeks. As well as the military attacks, the Frontier Corps (FC) has been responsible for indiscriminate rocket, artillery and helicopter gunship attacks on civilian areas. There has been widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, including schools and houses, particularly in Dera Bugti and Sui districts. Military operations occur throughout the province.

The insurgents, however, strike back on a daily basis. Targeting military and FC personnel, gas and oil pipelines, communications infrastructure and police barracks, the insurgents launch rocket, grenade and mortar attacks. Some areas are heavily mined by the nationalist fighters.

On Pakistan TV on January 10, 2005, President Pervez Musharraf told the Baloch nationalists: “Don’t push us … it is not the 1970s, and this time you won’t even know what has hit you.” Unfortunately for the president, it is beginning to look exactly like 1973 as the insurgency gathers strength and ties down Pakistan army divisions in guerrilla warfare.

Murder of Comrade Abdullah Qureshi

Abdullah Qureshi, 1935 — 2007
Farooq Tariq, Lahore
25 January 2008

On December 9, 72-year-old Abdullah Qureshi, a member of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) provincial council of the Labour Party Pakistan (LPP), was murdered in a suicide attack in Swat valley — currently the scene of a military operation against religious fundamentalists who control a majority of the valley.

One of the main reasons given by the dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf for the imposition of the state of emergency on November 3 was to free the valley from the religious fanatics. Qureshi was the pioneer of left politics in Swat valley. Born in 1935, he came from a working class background. In the early ’50s he founded “Swat Rorwali” (Swat Goodwill), which organised the people’s resistance against the nawab of Swat, who at the time was absolute ruler of the valley. Arrested several times, Qureshi was deported from the valley in the early ’60s. He settled in Gojaranwala, Punjab.

He was a close friend of Ajmal Khatak and Sikander Khan Khalil, the leaders of the National Awami Party, the main Pakistani left party in the ’60s. In 1968, when Swat valley formally joined Pakistan, Qureshi returned to Swat to organise the NAP. He was elected Swat NAP general secretary. The government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto banned the party in 1974 and Qureshi was arrested. He joined the Awami National Party, the new name of the banned party. He was unsatisfied with the ideological confusion within the party, wanting a more socialist orientation.

Later he joined the Pakistan National Party. Disillusioned by the fall of the Soviet Union, he withdrew from left politics. He joined the LPP after it organised Swat valley’s largest May Day rally in 2006, attended by over 600 workers. The red flags covering the valley inspired him to join the party, despite being over 70. At the second NWFP LPP provincial conference in June 2007, he was elected to the provincial council. Within a year, he had organised the party throughout Swat, making it the area’s main left party. Most left activists in Swat joined the LPP after he did.

Hakim Bahudar, LPP national committee member and a close friend of Qureshi, said: “He was very much inspired by LPP activities for some time. He was a regular reader of Mazdoor Jeddojuhd (Workers Struggle — the LPP’s journal). After he joined the LPP, the party became very respected and prestigious [throughout the] valley. He was the symbol of left politics.” The suicide attack resulted in the deaths of several other civilians. The LPP’s 4th national conference was taking place in Lahore at the time. Qureshi and other delegates from the valley could not attend because of roadblocks and military operations.

Qureshi’s family did not want to disclose the news of his murder earlier because of fear of more attacks. They believe it was a targeted attack because of his left-wing activism. The family is investigating this and has asked LPP to help. Now, with the permission of the family, the LPP is announcing his death with great pain.

Although Comrade Qureshi was only in the LPP for 16 months, his whole life was devoted to left-wing ideals. Willing to risk his life for these, he joined the LPP while there was an upsurge of religious fundamentalism in the valley. The LPP will hold memorial meetings all over Pakistan.

[The LPP is calling for assistance from pro-democracy supporters around the world to help carry out its work. To help, you can deposit money in the account: People’s Power Fighting Fund, Commonwealth Bank, 062026 1006 0743.]